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Abstract / Resumo 
 
In a number of developed countries, lack of discipline in domestic fiscal policy 
has been driving sovereign debt to unsustainable levels. The combination of severe 
political failures and ineffective budgetary rules has allowed the establishment of 
lingering fiscal deficits that must be eradicated. In this paper, the causes of fiscal 
indiscipline as well as the role of some institutional mechanisms aimed at controlling 
them are analyzed, and it is argued that independent fiscal agencies are suitable 
complements to rules and regulations. These independent agencies are divided into 
independent fiscal authorities and fiscal policy councils. With a greater focus on the 
euro area, this work surveys the literature for explanations of how independent fiscal 
agencies – councils in particular – may help avert fiscal profligacy. Existing councils 
from a handful of countries are presented and some lessons are drawn from their recent 
experiences. The conclusion drawn is that the impact of these agencies on policy is 
generally perceived as positive and significant. 
 
Presentemente, a acumulação excessiva de dívida pública é uma verdadeira 
ameaça à sustentabilidade financeira de muitos países desenvolvidos. Na base do 
problema está o estabelecimento generalizado e prolongado duma cultura de 
indisciplina orçamental nos órgãos de decisão que alimentou a criação de défices 
crónicos. Concretamente, a indisciplina orçamental resulta duma panóplia de falhas 
políticas e da ineficácia das regras orçamentais. Neste trabalho são analisados quais os 
melhores mecanismos institucionais para garantir a disciplina orçamental e conclui-se 
que um bom complemento às regras orçamentais serão as agências orçamentais 
independentes. Estas podem ser subdivididas em autoridades orçamentais independentes 
e conselhos de finanças públicas. Enfatizando o caso dos países da área do euro, este 
trabalho procura na literatura económica explicações acerca da forma como estas 
agências – particularmente os conselhos – podem contribuir para o rigor orçamental. 
São apresentados alguns conselhos e são retiradas lições das suas experiências recentes. 
Conclui-se que os impactos destas instituições na política orçamental são, de um modo 
geral, tidos como positivos e significativos.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past 40 years, the sovereign debt
1
 of the member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have suffered a 
significant increase from about 30 to 90 percent of total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). This astonishing debt escalation in developed countries is unprecedented. In 
value, public debt in these 34 countries totalled more than 39 trillion dollars in 2011
2
.  
A major concern about this trend is that, unless it is reversed soon enough, it may 
eventually result in a collapse of the global economy. The world seems to have 
forgotten a basic principle, which is that debt must be repaid. Fiscal laxity and 
procrastination have led to a situation that is beyond alarming – it is now absolutely 
urgent as it may assume uncontrolled proportions sometime in a near future. After the 
end of the 1990s economic boom and the 2008 world crisis, growth has cooled in the 
developed world, which means that a collapse of the global economy is now more likely 
if developed countries start defaulting on their sovereign debt. 
In the particular case of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
recent events in Greece and Portugal must be recognised as a serious indication of how 
important it is to quickly address the debt issue in a concerted manner. These countries 
recently entered a debt spiral: as they started borrowing in order to pay interests owed 
from prior debt, their interest rates in capital markets rose to unbearable levels, forcing 
them to ask for international financial bailouts. However, these events were the 
culmination of a long history of lack of fiscal discipline and macroeconomic 
imbalances; more specifically, a history of consistent budgetary deficits in public 
finances that often prevented compliance with euro area fiscal rules, a history of opacity 
in the accountability of public finances, and a history of not only provoking a sovereign 
debt crisis, but also endangering the stability of all other euro area member states. 
Objectively, problems of excessive public debt are primarily up to policy-makers 
to solve. Therefore, a strong wave of political will towards resolving debt is vital. In 
                                                          
1
 Sovereign debt corresponds to a country‟s aggregate general government gross financial liabilities.  
2
 According to OECD statistics, in 2011 estimated GDP in the OECD area was approximately 43 524 480 
million dollars (43,5 trillion) – See http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=SNA_TABLE1. 
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addition, it is necessary to unveil the causes of this fiscal profligacy. Only by attacking 
its causes is it going to be possible to attain fiscal sustainability. Thus, effective 
solutions to discipline fiscal policy have to be set up. This is the only viable way of re-
establishing a stable and growth-enhancing macroeconomic environment. 
The purpose of this work is to contribute to the clarification of the reasons behind 
and solutions to the aforementioned fiscal policy problems. To achieve this, the fiscal 
landscape will be depicted – especially with regards to the euro area – and its problems 
identified; then the failure of current institutions will be discussed and new and more 
efficient ones proposed. The work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
causes of the deficit bias; Chapter 3 describes the pros and cons of rules in overcoming 
the bias as well as how those can be complemented by other institutions, notably 
independent fiscal agencies; Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
independent fiscal authorities and fiscal councils; Chapter 5 draws from the experiences 
of existing fiscal policy councils, namely by exploring their major challenges and gains. 
At the end, some final remarks will be put forth. 
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2. Bias in fiscal policy 
 
In the last 40 years, fiscal policy-making in most democracies has been inherently 
biased towards budgetary deficits. In general, a deficit bias in public finances occurs 
when the government‟s expenditure repeatedly exceeds its revenues. 
Most of the time, budgetary deficits are financed by issuing public debt. 
Therefore, as a result of deficit bias, industrialized countries have been experiencing an 
increasing accumulation of sovereign debt. Many economists repeatedly describe the 
current indebtedness of developed economies as excessive and harmful in terms of the 
societies‟ welfare. Excessive government debt accumulation is typically against the 
long-run interest of voters.  
 
Figure 2.1 – General government gross financial liabilities (%GDP), 1970-2012  
 
 
Source: OECD (2011) – Dataset: Annual Projections for OECD Countries 
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Figure 2.1 depicts the notorious upward trend in the OECD countries‟ debt. The 
general debt build-up observed in the OECD has not been equal from one country to 
another. For example, as illustrated in the figure, while the United States continues 
procrastinating budget consolidation efforts, in Sweden, the governments have been 
changing policies, procedures and institutions to overcome the Swedish deficit bias 
since the mid-1990s. Anyhow, in four decades, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in OECD 
countries rose about 60 percentage points. Nevertheless, the recession in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis in 2008 has played an important role in the expansion of debt, 
being true that the effects of which could have hardly been anticipated or controlled. 
The latest and more paradigmatic cases of excessive and punitive indebtedness are 
the ones of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In 2010, the financial crisis triggered a 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece, which was then followed by both Ireland and Portugal. 
All three countries share the same currency, the Euro, which was launched in 1999 
within the EMU and includes another 14 member states of the European Union (EU).  
 
Figure 2.2 – Harmonized long-term interest rates (percentage), 1993-2012 
(Percentages per annum; period averages; secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities of close to ten years) 
Source: ECB (2012a) – SDW dataset: Interest rate statistics 
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Figure 2.2 shows the long-term (10 year) interest rates in the secondary market for 
government bonds of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Germany. One noteworthy 
observation is that, since the beginning of the Euro, the peripheral countries – Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal – have benefited from interest rates nearly as low as the ones of 
„well-behaved‟ countries in the euro area, like Germany. A second remark is that before 
1999, interest rates for Germany were markedly lower from the ones of the three 
countries. Hence, a reasonable ex post interpretation may be that, after 1999, markets 
should not have charged Greece, Ireland and Portugal the same interest rates as those of 
Germany solely because the four of them then belonged to the EMU. A likely reason for 
this homogenization between 1999 and 2008 was the general belief among both rating 
agencies and investors that all euro area countries‟ debt involved similar risks.  
Unfortunately, the benefits of low interest rates have been taken advantage of by a 
number of undisciplined countries. These nurtured the vicious habit of constantly 
borrowing at low prices which did not reflect the true health of their public finances. In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis the capital market began to increasingly discredit the 
Greek economy, and later the Portuguese. The Irish case is somewhat different since it 
was only after the 2008 financial crisis that the Irish debt escalation took place. Instead 
of a budgetary crisis, Ireland faced a severe banking crisis that culminated in the 
nationalization of banks and the State‟s assumption of their liabilities. Only after the 
collapse of the banking system did Ireland have the need to borrow increasing amounts 
of funds from capital markets. After diminishing its public debt from 82 to 26% of GDP 
between 1995 and 2006, Ireland has had an astonishing amplification of debt reaching 
almost 110% of GDP in 2012 (see Figure 2.3). 
The sustainability of these countries‟ sovereign debt and the soundness of their 
public finances (and also of the financial system in the Irish case) have since been 
questioned, and a sense of unpredictability about their future grew among investors in 
the capital market. In general, investors have become less confident in the capability of 
governments to repay their public debt, and that was aggravated when these countries 
started to enter the dangerous vicious cycle of issuing new debt to repay prior debts and 
interest. Therefore, the risk premia associated with their additional credits rose at a 
considerable pace.  
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The remarkable rise in interest rates depicted in Figure 2.2 was a clear reaction to 
the apprehensiveness of investors in face of the growing probability of bankruptcy of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In April 2010, Greece was forced to formally ask for the 
EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial rescue. Ireland later did the same in 
November, and Portugal in April 2011. Hence, as can be observed in Figure 2.2, 2010 
was a critical year, in which the long-term interest rates in the secondary market for 
government bonds shot up in Greece as well as in Ireland and Portugal. In Greece, 
however, the market turmoil continued to increase sharply throughout 2011 and up until 
the 21
st
 of February 2012, when the private sector creditors agreed on a 53,5% haircut 
on the value of their Greek government bonds, swapping them into new bonds with a 
3.65% interest rates and a maturity of 30 years. In addition, previously in July 2011, the 
leaders of the euro area had approved a further comprehensive package of measures to 
help Greece get back on track.  
All three countries have to now fulfil formal fiscal consolidation agreements with 
their international creditors. The memorandum of understanding signed between each 
country and the international creditors dictates severe expenditure cuts and increases in 
revenues, both in the short and the medium to long terms, and imply a wide array of 
reforms, most of them structural, ranging from restructuring health and pension systems 
to liberalizing the labour market. This consolidation effort is the only viable way to 
restore the soundness in public finances required to foster domestic competitiveness and 
economic growth. 
Even though it was the 2007/08 financial crisis that was the trigger of the 
sovereign debt crises, what really led Greece and Portugal into a debt trap was, 
essentially, the continued increase of their expenditure during the last three or four 
decades hardly had a corresponding adjustment in terms of tax intakes. All credits have 
to be repaid someday, yet this did not scare or deter successive governments in those 
countries from relentlessly borrow. As may be observed in Figure 2.3, in Portugal, the 
public debt rose from approximately 60% to 108% of GDP since the mid-1990s. In 
Greece, the increase was from 97% to 165% of GDP
1
 [OECD (2011)].  
 
                                                          
1
 The latter figures already account for the IMF-EU financial rescue package corresponding to 2011. 
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Figure 2.3 – Public debt in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (%GDP), 1996-2012 
(Percentage points, series(t)/GDP(t); all sectors without general government (consolidation) (ESA95) - Financial stocks at 
nominal value) 
Source: ECB (2012b) – SDW dataset: Government Statistics  
 
A systemic problem of indebtedness was thus installed in these small economies 
that, in combination with procrastination in introducing needed fiscal consolidation 
reforms, resulted in a crisis. The sovereign debt crises in Greece and Portugal were like 
the eruption of a scorching volcano that had been repeatedly fed with embers. 
Nevertheless, even though these two countries came first, they are not the only ones 
infected by a deficit bias and excessive debt problems. If fiscal behaviours are not 
changed in several OECD countries, their „volcanoes‟ will probably also „ignite‟ sooner 
or later. The recent developments in the capital markets for Spanish, Italian and Cypriot 
government bonds are confirming these fears. 
Fiscal discipline and sound public finances are vital to create a stable 
macroeconomic environment that fosters potential and sustainable growth. Conversely, 
lax fiscal conduct is a major determinant of excessive indebtedness
2
. In distinguishing 
between a disciplined and an undisciplined government, four major aspects stand out.  
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 See, for example, Wyplosz (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Calmfors (2010a), von Hagen (2010). 
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First, a disciplined government conducts discipline-enhancing countercyclical 
fiscal policies and combines the use of fiscal discretion with the role of automatic 
stabilizers. In contrast, undisciplined governments conduct procyclical policies instead –
expansionary, for the most part, during economic upswings. Accordingly, undisciplined 
governments do not save or decrease their levels of debt in good times in order to gain 
leeway in bad times. Therefore, in face of negative shocks, unprepared governments 
may find themselves unable to use fiscal discretion as a complement to automatic 
stabilizers. 
Procyclical behaviours during good times often result from the inability of 
governments to control their spending and/or increase taxes when needed. Eventually, 
this kind of conduct necessarily intensifies budgetary deficits. In a number of EU 
Member States, for example, the prevalence of procyclicality in good times has 
contributed significantly to major unsustainable increases in the stocks of public debt 
[European Commission (2006a)]. Hence, if policy is not countercyclical during 
upswings, public debt may ascend to levels that may force governments to suddenly 
adopt severe measures – like abruptly raising taxes and/or cutting spending – even if 
doing so exacerbates the effects of a recession. Greece and Portugal, given their 
excessive sovereign debts, are recent examples on how procyclical policies are truly 
unsustainable in the long run and may cause serious bottlenecks in the economy. 
Along this vein, a second major aspect distinguishing a disciplined government 
from an undisciplined one is that only the former is truly concerned about the long-run 
sustainability of public finances. Thus, fiscal discipline implies that fiscal policy should 
allow for enough short-run fiscal flexibility while respecting the intertemporal 
budgetary constraint. Furthermore, a disciplined government would not permit a 
continuous rise of public debt, and when high debts are too much of a burden, it would 
compromise to bring the debt down to more comfortable levels [Wyplosz (2002, 2005)]. 
On the contrary, undisciplined governments often preclude long-term sustainability 
concerns from the usual course of their short-term fiscal policy-making. Fundamentally, 
these governments do not (want to) restrain their levels of public debt. Ultimately, the 
mix of stubborn deficits and increasing debt resulting from indiscipline undermines 
macroeconomic stability and sustainability. 
9 
 
To clarify what fiscal sustainability stands for, it is useful to refer to the work of 
the European Commission (EC). The EC claims that a country‟s sustainable fiscal 
position is one where, given current policies and projected budgetary trends, the country 
is able to meet its intertemporal budget constraint and still continue to comply with the 
budget rules in force [EC (2010a)]. In turn, respecting the intertemporal constraint 
implies that a government ensures today that in the future the country will manage to 
have sufficient budgetary surpluses to service debt and to be solvent, i.e., to have the 
ability to meet its current and future financial obligations. Nevertheless, the 
intertemporal constraint is necessary but not sufficient for sustainability; other factors 
are important as well. For instance, the relation between the primary balance and public 
debt, the analysis of the debt-ratio trend (sustainability concerns are completely 
different when debt is receding from when it is increasing) and the fiscal adjustment 
needed to stabilize or reduce the debt-ratio are all aspects that must be considered when 
discussing the sustainability of public finances [Celasun et al. (2006)]. Furthermore, 
apropos the importance of budget sustainability, one can compare a governmental 
budget to an individual budget: anyone who persistently spends more than s/he earns, 
with no view to reversing the situation, will eventually be declared bankrupt. Facing a 
similar situation, and assuming bankruptcy is not an option, a government has to 
choose: either it raises taxes substantially, thus burdening future generations, or it 
allows inflation to rise significantly, diminishing the value of the public debt but also of 
savers‟ wealth3. As both outcomes are largely undesirable, budget sustainability 
concerns should therefore be seriously considered as a chief criterion governing fiscal 
policy [Wren-Lewis (2003)]. 
A third contrasting aspect concerns prudence. A disciplined government typically 
strives to reduce fiscal imbalances in order to guarantee the soundness of public 
finances in the medium and long run. Prudence in fiscal policy is advisable in order to 
promote a stable and sustainable macroeconomic environment. Besides, fiscal policy-
makers should be prepared for unexpected contingencies in the short-term by amassing 
a satisfactory level of precautionary savings [Calmfors (2010a)].  
                                                          
3
 Even though, this is not an option for euro area countries. 
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The last difference concerns intergenerational equity or, in other words, an 
equitable distribution of welfare across generations. In the event of a growing need to 
borrow, a disciplined government would question if it is legitimate to shift tax burdens 
on to future generations or if an alternative path should be found. A traditional argument 
against high debt is that it may place an unfair burden on future generations. 
Notwithstanding, as Musgrave (1988) notes, if contemporary voters do not sufficiently 
care about future generations, then they may elect governments that will exploit them. 
Therefore, in this case, the government is not the only agent being selfish and 
undisciplined but, there are also citizens who are impatient and greedy. 
Given the propensity for indiscipline in many developed economies and how 
unsustainable that may be, it is necessary to design feasible measures to counteract it. 
Before searching for solutions, one first has to uncover the roots of the problem. The 
current literature lifts the veil on a number of issues related to the problem of deficit 
bias and its underlying causes. To understand these phenomena we must recall some 
topics in political economy. In what follows, the most important causes presented in the 
literature will be listed, such as issues related to the common-pool of resources, time 
inconsistency and impatience, political failures, over-optimism and other explanations. 
(i) Common-pool problems. Several authors link common-pool problems to 
budgetary deficits and other fiscal imbalances. Among them are von Hagen and Harden 
(1994), Eichengreen et al. (1999), Calmfors (2005), Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006, 
2009), Debrun et al. (2009) and von Hagen (2010). Some conclusions can be drawn 
from their work on this subject. 
Common-pool problems – or “tragedy of the commons” as was first called – play 
a central role in deficit bias
4
. When there is political fragmentation, that is, several 
decision-makers involved in the budget process (e.g., unthrifty ministers, lobby groups 
and/or parties in a coalition government), they compete for their preferred public goods 
but they do not internalize the current and future costs associated with their choices. 
These costs typically entail deficits and additional debt and, therefore, higher taxes to 
repay them. 
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 The seminal work about the commons problem is Hardin (1968). 
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 The commons problem occurs when various interest groups lobby in favour of 
expenditure increases or tax decreases to their own benefit, disregarding the economy-
wide effects. In this case, some interest groups and constituencies view government 
revenues as a common pool of resources open to competing demands. In addition, the 
common-pool problem can also be defined as an externality - while the benefits of 
additional expenditure are enjoyed only by specific groups, all tax-payers will have to 
finance it and, hence, the beneficiaries only pay for a small part of their benefits. Thus, 
without a mechanism to coordinate the actions of these interest groups, the pressures 
from lobbyists can result in excessive spending and, given that raising taxes is always 
politically difficult, excessive deficits.  
Common pool problems and procyclicality are not unrelated. During good times, 
the government faces pressure from constituencies in order to spend extra revenues for 
their own benefit and not according to the preferences of society as a whole. As a result, 
revenues tend not to be used to improve the government‟s fiscal position during 
upswings, and as this position always worsens during downturns, a rise in public debt 
may become unavoidable. The relationship between the commons problem and 
procyclicality can also be presented in a dynamic context. Some authors believe that 
intertemporal distortions may lead governments to squander the benefits of economic 
booms. In essence, different groups have an incentive to grab all the resources they find 
if they fear that other groups may anticipate the boom and do the same. This attitude 
tends to lead to the immediate dissipation of any additional resources a government 
happens to have at its disposal, rather than these being carried over as public savings.  
 (ii) Time inconsistency and impatience. The time inconsistency of preferences is 
another major explanation for the deficit bias plaguing the public finances of many 
modern economies
5
. 
The decision-makers‟ commitment to optimal, medium-term fiscal plans holds 
little credibility, much in the same way as in monetary policy. Thus, time inconsistency 
happens when policies that were optimal ex ante – when private sector expectations 
were formed and actions were taken accordingly – are no longer so ex post – after the 
                                                          
5
 The seminal work about time inconsistency is Kydland and Prescott (1977).  
See also, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) for an early formalization of the problem and 
Beetsma and Debrun (2004, 2005) for its application in fiscal policy. 
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actions of the private sector. One example of time inconsistency in fiscal policy is 
straightforward: ex ante, governments usually acknowledge that countercyclicality is 
optimal and formulate the budget accordingly, namely aiming at budget consolidations 
during expansions in order to have sufficient leeway to adopt countercyclical measures 
during downturns; however, during economic upswings – that is, ex post – governments 
have strong incentives to undervalue countercyclicality and fail to pursue the ex ante 
optimal policy – consolidate the budget – in order not to damage their electorate. Hence, 
if countercyclicality is not preserved, that is, if in good times fiscal policy does not 
compensate for the larger deficits run in times of recession, then debt will increase over 
the business cycle [von Hagen (2010)]
6
.  
Not infrequently, governments find it more rewarding to deviate from their pre-
announced fiscal policies rather than sticking to them. Even if governments anticipate 
some long-term costs, the circumstances may tempt them to reach some short-term 
policy goals that require the adoption of deficit-enlarging measures. This attitude is 
often referred to as the „impatience of governments‟ in view of the fact that they may 
discount the long-term costs at a higher rate than the electorate because they fear losing 
at upcoming elections. Consequently, before elections, a government may have 
incentives to boost its popularity with the electorate by running expansionary fiscal 
policies which would eventually result in larger deficits and additional debt. In this way, 
the impatience of governments helps explain why time inconsistency may be present in 
medium-term fiscal plans. More specifically, after a plan has been announced, the 
government‟s mindset shifts mainly to the short-term; that is, the governments‟ concept 
of fiscal optimality shifts from the distant to the near future thus precipitating the 
deviation from the pre-announced policies.  
Besides impatience, a closely related explanation for excessive debt accumulation 
is short-sightedness or present-bias. Typically, a person‟s discount rate denotes 
impatience. People prefer immediate rather than delayed rewards. In addition, people‟s 
impatience is bigger facing short-run rather than long-run trade-offs. These sets of 
preferences can lead to sub-optimal behaviours. Applied to („naïve‟) policy-makers, this 
kind of preferences may result in procrastination: they often postpone raising tax 
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 Besides von Hagen (2010), there are several other studies devoted to time inconsistency, namely 
Calmfors (2005), Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a). 
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revenues to cover expenditures. Policy-makers often (purposely) forget that at some 
point in the future a larger sum of debt will have to be serviced. Such delays may force 
public finances to a stage where, to raise sufficient revenues, the introduction of 
economically damaging tax rates is inevitable. 
A last insight on time inconsistency in fiscal policy is from Castellani and Debrun 
(2005), who argue that monetary policy delegation to independent central banks (ICB) 
in order to solve problems of time inconsistency may end up in merely moving time 
inconsistency from monetary to fiscal policy.  The explanation is simple. If the central 
bank induces monetary restraints (i.e., operations aimed at diminishing inflation and 
achieving price stability), then inflation decreases, unemployment increases and 
incentives are created for the government to engage in expansionary fiscal actions to 
offset these recessive effects. This will probably result in amplified government 
spending (or diminished revenues), which, in turn, would enlarge budgetary deficits. 
(iii) Political failures. Fiscal indiscipline is the result of political failure. Many 
researchers argue that deficit bias is the result of a political set with perverse incentives, 
notably disrupted by a wide array of strategic behaviours of elected politicians. A 
number of these failures have been identified in the literature. 
A political failure often pointed out is the strategic use of debt by governments. 
Typically, governments in power do not completely internalize the costs future 
governments will bear servicing the public debt issued in the current legislature 
[Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2009)]. Such a situation creates perverse incentives to current 
governments as it makes issuing debt less costly than otherwise. Hence: “Disagreement 
amongst alternating policy-makers and uncertainty about who will be appointed in the 
future prevent the current government from fully internalizing the cost of leaving debt to 
its successors” [in Alesina and Tabellini (1990), p.404]. Besides, from this fact it can 
also be deduced that the lower the re-election chances of the current government, the 
bigger its incentives to use debt strategically to affect the activity of the next one. 
Accordingly, when re-election chances are low the stock of public debt tends to be 
larger than the social optimum. Thus, in these cases, political failure is characterized by 
the non-coincidence between the governments‟ preferences and the average citizens‟ 
preferences. 
14 
 
Another form of governments‟ misuse of debt relates to electoral strategy. If two 
parties, alternating in government, have different spending preferences, the one in 
government may have incentives to build-up the stock of public debt in order to pre-
commit the other on its future level of spending. For this reason, a government can use 
debt service to strategically crowd out spending from the subsequent legislature [von 
Hagen (2010)]. As a consequence, governments become successively stuck with 
excessive levels of debt and the public finances‟ imbalances persistently deteriorate. 
In addition, Rogoff (1990) identified the existence of political budget cycles in 
fiscal policy. These arise from the coincidence of elections and economic policy cycles 
and help explain the deficit bias of modern democracies. Their existence is mainly 
justified by the incumbent government‟s necessity of signalling competence and 
efficiency near the electorate. Therefore, during election years, all levels of government 
boost their consumption. Besides, typical election frameworks may include other policy 
changes that necessarily increase budgetary deficits, such as tax cutbacks, larger 
transfers and highly visible projects supported by government spending. 
An additional important political failure may occur at the end of the legislature 
when the political parties in power, particularly those that are about to lose elections, 
start to favour their own constituencies [Calmfors (2005)]
7
. Moreover, a related 
hypothesis sometimes put forward is that the shorter the term of office in government 
and the more rapid the political turnover, the higher the deficits and debt are. A possible 
reason for this is that in short-lived governments, politicians tend to overestimate the 
benefits of spending and consumption [see Grilli et al. (1994) and Rogoff and 
Bertelsmann (2010)]. 
(iv) Over-optimism problems. A further problem plaguing fiscal policy that is 
mentioned in the literature is over-optimism [e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Rogoff 
and Bertelsmann (2010) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a)].  
Over-optimism can be defined as the belief often held by politicians and the 
electorate that the future will be brighter than the present. Over the years, over-
optimism has fostered behaviours that lead to debt and banking crises. The underlying 
                                                          
7
 However, the view that this kind of uncertainty over re-election usually results in deficits is 
controversial. For instance, Roubini and Sachs (1989) find some support for this theory while Lambertini 
(2003) does not find any. 
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reason is that people and governments are comfortable with overspending and 
borrowing given that they believe in a more prosperous future in which they are going 
to be able to repay their debts. Moreover, when a government has overly optimistic 
beliefs about some key macroeconomic variables – growth, for example – some 
budgetary plans, dependent on the evolution of such variables, may not turn out as 
expected. For instance, tax revenues may persistently remain below expectations 
resulting in deficit creation/enlargement. Nevertheless, the need for short-term financing 
often overlaps the deficit-constraining concerns. The underlying rationale is based on 
the belief that future generations will be richer and, thus, it is acceptable to borrow more 
today to smooth consumption across generations. Thus, over-confidence can be 
interpreted as a psychological phenomenon that results in people believing all things 
will remain stable in the future. This impels them to make poor judgments under 
conditions of uncertainty. Hence, over-confidence often results in people – and 
governments – under-saving and under-insuring, which makes it another important 
determinant of deficit persistence. 
Jonung and Larch (2006) look at governmental over-optimism from a different 
perspective. In their work, the problem is identified as the use of biased official growth 
forecasts in the budget process. Specifically, it is argued that in some countries, the 
projections of the macroeconomic variables used to build medium-term budgetary plans 
are recurrently over-optimistic in order to make the budget balance look better ex ante. 
When, ex post, the outcome is not satisfactory, governments often blame bad luck or 
extraneous circumstances. These biased forecasts then translate into fiscal actions that 
are more expansionary than would be the case otherwise, accelerating the accumulation 
of debt. On a similar note, Strauch et al. (2004) name some political economy 
explanations for errors in forecasting. Once again, elections (or the political business 
cycle) are one of the most influential sources of those errors. In a nutshell, incumbent 
politicians want to signal an overly healthy economy and budget balance to voters, 
issuing, for this purpose, over-optimistic forecasts. If the public believes the forecasts, it 
will appear that the government is doing well. 
(v) Other explanations. The issues discussed above are only some of the most 
important political economy explanations for deficit bias. There are other relevant 
considerations surrounding this bias, two of which are delineated below. 
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Representative democracy presupposes that elected politicians will reflect their 
electorate‟s preferences in decision-making8. In turn, the very process of representation 
presumes that a large part of the electorate lacks some information about the functioning 
of the State. This discrepancy can thus be exploited: as voters are often unaware of the 
government‟s true fiscal position, they allow the government opportunities to run fiscal 
policy under political rather than economic criteria. This offers clear incentives for the 
government to create a political business cycle, namely to cut taxes or boost spending in 
order to increase its chances of re-election. In the end, since there is no equal incentive 
to raise taxes or cut spending, a deficit bias will follow [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis 
(2011a)]. 
Second, in most countries, the process of assembling the budget lacks effective 
mechanisms/procedures of control. The absence of appropriate rules, checks and 
balances within that process makes it difficult to channel policy-makers‟ incentives into 
fiscal discipline [Fabrizio and Mody (2006)]. The budget process is often decentralized, 
it is seldom audited from external entities and only a few countries have applied top-
down approaches to it. This amateurism in the budget process has often resulted in over-
spending and so helped fuel deficit biases. However, during the 1990s, some countries 
made efforts to centralize their budget processes, notably those that were torn by rather 
fragmented decision-making structures. Paradoxically, in many of them, these efforts 
gave rise to some budgetary coordination problems instead of resulting in a more 
effective elimination of spending biases. Along these lines, Hallerberg et al. (2006) 
further found that the type of government (namely if it is a coalition government or a 
single-party one) also influences the strength of fiscal discipline. Therefore, in some 
countries, the existence of coalition governments may have also contributed towards 
preventing the existent mechanisms/procedures of budget control from eliminating the 
persistent deficits and excessive indebtedness. 
 
                                                          
8
 On the other hand, as Maskin and Tirole (2004) [p.2] ask, “(…) if representatives decide for the public, 
what induces them to act in the public interest?” There could be two motivations for the representative: 
he wants to leave a legacy and/or he values being in office for its own sake. So, “(…) the public can 
harness these two motives by making the official accountable, that is, by requiring her to run for 
reelection every so often”. It is then possible that an elected representative will not maximize the average 
citizen‟s utility (roughly the same as social welfare) but rather its own preferences (or a mix of these two 
sets of preferences). 
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3. Overcoming deficit bias: rules vs. institutions 
 
The unsustainability of persistent budgetary imbalances has been, since the end of 
the twentieth century, a major cause for institutional reforms in several countries. Since 
then, fiscal rules have been paramount in the domestic fiscal framework reforms. The 
IMF (2009) identifies an increasing popularization of fiscal rules during the 1990s, with 
their adoption growing more than ten-fold between 1990 and 2009. 
One possible definition of rules comes from Kopits and Symanski (1998). They 
define rules as permanent constraints on fiscal policy that specify a numerical target or a 
limit for key budgetary aggregates such as the annual budget balance, expenditure, 
revenue, or debt. The primary objective of a rule is to enhance budgetary discipline. 
More specifically, however, fiscal rules may be seen as intermediate objectives in order 
to facilitate the attainment of more fundamental, higher-level objectives, notes Calmfors 
(2010b). Among these are long-run fiscal sustainability, social efficiency through tax 
smoothing (i.e., minimizing the distortionary costs of taxation, thus improving social 
welfare), intergenerational equity (i.e., equitable distribution of welfare across 
generations) and, lastly, precautionary savings, which is the same as being prepared for 
unanticipated contingencies both in the short and long run. All these aims can only be 
realised within a reliable fiscal environment, notably when governments are disciplined 
and truly represent social preferences. If this is not the case, and distortions cause fiscal 
policy to diverge from society‟s preferences, there are then reasons to introduce a fiscal 
rule [Milesi-Ferretti (2004)]. A fiscal rule, unlike the higher-level objectives, is a simple 
and well-defined benchmark against which fiscal policy can be judged in the short and 
medium terms. Rules give an intermediary objective to fiscal policy and permit the 
attainment of the more complex objectives in the long run. 
One can find a number of raisons d'être of fiscal rules. One lies on the fact that, 
given that decisions on rules are independent from the governments‟ office terms, they 
may help offset the deficit bias that results directly from political short-sightedness and 
rent-seeking behaviours. Another rationale is that, as they do not change with different 
circumstances, rules also address the problems related to time-inconsistency. Besides, as 
noted by Calmfors (2010b), they offer an opportunity for agents to rise above the day-
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to-day struggle for resources and thus help to internalize the common-pool externality. 
Fiscal rules also play an important role in constraining perverse incentives of politicians 
when there is no political commitment to fiscal discipline (or it is insufficiently strong). 
Besides, in a transparent fiscal process and with fiscally committed politicians, 
numerical/quantitative fiscal rules can also improve fiscal performance [Hagemann 
(2010)]. 
The OECD has argued for the effectiveness of rules, notably by noting that 
countries that adopt well-designed fiscal rules may achieve better fiscal performance 
[OECD (2007)]. Even so, there is an unclear causality between rules and fiscal 
discipline. It is difficult to distinguish if governments are adopting rules because they 
were already disciplined and want to signalize it or, instead, if it is the adoption of rules 
that is leading to a stronger governments‟ commitment to fiscal discipline [Debrun 
(2007)]. Nonetheless, a crucial condition for a fiscal rule to be effective is that it needs 
to be well adjusted to the country‟s existing institutions and political system. Not 
everything is country-specific though; all countries share key common features when 
introducing rules that one can identify. First, transparency in the process of instituting 
rules is crucial, and it has to be combined with sufficient flexibility to face shocks. 
Second, rules must cover all the relevant budget items and, lastly, there must be 
effective enforcement mechanisms. Still, depending on the contingencies, some fiscal 
rules prove more effective than others. For example, fiscal deficit rules may be less 
effective than instrument-specific rules [Castellani and Debrun (2005)]. Additionally, 
rules in the form of deficit or debt ceilings may not restrain fiscal policy as effectively 
as one can imagine, as governments normally end up very close to the ceilings. This 
reflects a weak commitment to fiscal discipline and prudence as governments do not 
worry about creating sufficient leeway to overcome adverse shocks. 
In addition, the effectiveness of rules depends mainly on the government‟s 
perception of the costs of breaching them. Implicit here is a major vulnerability of rules, 
which is that they can be (and routinely are) broken [Debrun and Kumar (2008)]. 
Besides, the more stringent rules are, the more incentives governments have to 
circumvent them and not comply with them. On the other hand, the more lax they are 
the more the government can undervalue fiscal discipline. Moreover, if simple, rules 
tend to be ineffective and if complex, they tend to be difficult to follow.  
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For rules to be optimal they have to be continuously and independently adapted to 
the economic context [Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2009)]. If, on the contrary, they are set 
once and not revised thereafter, in cases where the government is affected by deficit 
bias problems, rules will not allow for the necessary short-term flexibility to face 
unexpected shocks. In addition, fiscal rules may fail to promote the quality of fiscal 
policy since they do not indicate when and what fiscal adjustments are required. Hence, 
as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) suggest, when rules are binding and impel 
governments to improve their fiscal positions, governments may be tempted to cut the 
funding of strategic investments or other pro-growth expenditure instead of executing 
more innocuous – although more complex – cuts in other over-expensive budgetary 
items. 
There is a wide range of different rules governments can adopt. Their design must 
bear in mind the country‟s specific fiscal policy breaches or insufficiencies. Besides, 
different fiscal rules can be applied to the general, central, regional or local government 
or even to other government‟s sub-sectors like public enterprises or social security 
systems. Indeed, several developed countries throughout the world have adopted some 
of the most diverse sets of fiscal rules. 
Sweden and Chile have both adopted budget balance rules. Budget balance rules 
aim to bring revenues and expenditure to equilibrium within a pre-specified timeframe. 
They can be defined in a variety of ways; for example, a rule may oblige the 
government to assure that the public finances are in equilibrium over the economic 
cycle. For these rules to be effective they have to be cyclically-adjusted; otherwise, they 
may encourage procyclical behaviours [EC (2010b)]. 
The path that Sweden has been following towards fiscal discipline and 
sustainability since the mid-1990s results from a broad institutional reform that includes 
fiscal policy rules. After the deep economic crisis in the 1990s, with deficits reaching 
11% and public debt approaching 70% of GDP, Sweden launched a consolidation 
program to rebalance its public finances. The program consisted of introducing two 
budget rules: a rule that made it compulsory to have an average budgetary surplus of 1% 
of GDP over the cycle, and the introduction of a system of annual expenditure limits, 
namely a system that obliges the government to determine a mandatory spending cap to 
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be set in place three years later. Thus, each year, the budget approved by the 
government is constrained by the cap set three years earlier. This latter rule was 
accompanied by the adoption of a general policy principle focused on creating a budget 
margin to prevent the spending cap from being too rigid and to assure government 
compliance with it [Dolan (2011)].  
The Swedish rules intend to allow the government a sufficient margin to run 
countercyclical policies, that is, to be able to increase budgetary deficits during 
economic downturns and later compensate for them with the adequate surpluses 
throughout the subsequent upswings. However, other countries that implemented budget 
balance rules did not benefit from them as much as Sweden did. Chile, for example, 
adopted a similar rule in 2000, although not adjusted for the business cycle. The rule 
imposes a 1% of GDP surplus target on the government to be achieved every fiscal 
year. As a consequence, the rule mostly eliminates the possibility of using the business 
cycle to equilibrate public finances or, relatedly, to conduct countercyclical policies to 
stabilize the economy [Dolan (2011), Fiess (2005)]. The problem when budget balance 
rules are not cyclically-adjusted is the risk of excluding important productive and 
growth-enhancing public investments from the budget – e.g., R&D spending – merely 
in order to comply with the imposed ceilings. Therefore, the quality of public 
expenditure may be harmed by budget balance rules.  
In order to avoid the mentioned drawbacks, the United Kingdom was one of the 
first countries to introduce an alternative solution that excludes investment expenditure 
from the restraints imposed by rules. This solution is commonly known as a golden rule. 
The legal text of golden rules is usually comprised such that borrowing is only allowed 
for investments and not to finance current spending. This rule, however, may be not 
easily operationalised because investment is not a straightforward concept, opening 
space for policymakers to misuse it in order to circumvent the rule. Besides, the golden 
rule, by itself, does not limit debt or borrowing. These former two aspects are the likely 
reasons why the British government has also adopted a complementary rule, called the 
sustainable investment rule. This second rule obliges the public sector net debt to be 
held at a stable and prudent level, which is understood as being a maximum of 40% of 
GDP over the business cycle. 
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As in the UK, other countries too, mainly in Europe, have established debt rules. 
Debt rules may be formulated according to the debt repayment capacity of the borrower, 
or as a numerical ceiling to debt in percentage of GDP. The appropriate settings for 
such rules depend on the base on which one wants them to be applied to. For example, a 
debt rule may either restrain a sub-national sector or the central government. 
Nevertheless, it is not only debt that can be restrained by a rule; other elements of fiscal 
policy can be subjected to control too. Expenditure rules, for instance, may result in 
spending ceilings (sometimes in percentage of GDP, other times in percentage of total 
revenues or in various other forms) and/or may set up limits to the expenditure growth 
rate. These spending caps or limits are usually framed within the medium-term 
budgetary plans of the various levels of government. The goals of these rules are to 
address problems of procyclicality and successive expenditure overruns, and to assure a 
higher level of accountability and transparency in the spending process. Hence, in times 
of budget consolidation, these rules tend to be widely used, as they are perceived to be 
quite effective in promoting discipline. A similar concept is one of revenue rules: these 
can limit the allocation of revenues, determine what the tax burden should be (as a 
percentage of GDP) and/or place normative instructions concerning tax rates [EC 
(2010b)]. 
An important aspect that positively influences obedience to fiscal rules is whether 
or not they are legally or even constitutionally grounded. Germany, for example, has 
recently introduced constitutional fiscal rules to limit the structural deficit of the federal 
and the regional governments. The Federation is now constrained by a revised golden 
rule while the regions have to respect a zero-structural-deficit rule. The rules forbid any 
borrowing to finance public projects unless it is duly justified – mainly in cases where 
there are urgent investments that are significantly in the public interest – and only in the 
face of natural disasters or other emergency scenarios is the government exempt from 
complying with them. The aim of such rules is to ensure a sustained decline of the debt-
to-GDP ratio in Germany. Paradoxically however, debt abolishment, per se, may not be 
a truly desirable fiscal policy outcome since debt continues to be an important source of 
funding and a useful tool for economic stabilization. 
The new German constitutional rules are a remarkable political achievement and a 
step forward in providing the government with important commitments regarding fiscal 
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policy. The rules signal a compromise towards fiscal discipline and consolidation, the 
soundness of public finances, the promotion of fiscal stability and growth, and the 
restoration of confidence in the economy [Blondy (2009)]. According to Campanella 
(2011), there are essentially three reasons for giving fiscal rules a constitutional status. 
First, it is a natural deterrence against governments caving into the temptation of simply 
changing the law, since the procedures of altering a national constitution are very 
complex. Secondly, inscribing a discipline-enhancing rule in the law is a clear signal of 
the importance fiscal sustainability has to a country‟s society. Finally, the reputational 
costs for a government wanting to breach the rules are considerably higher in case it is 
„guarded‟ by a constitutional law. However, grounding a fiscal rule in the constitution 
will necessarily restrict the government‟s fiscal flexibility. Accordingly, the 
government‟s ability to adapt to changing economic environments, notably by using 
fiscal discretion at will, becomes considerably reduced with constitutional rules. In the 
end, it is essential to carefully design the rule ex ante so that it does not become a 
burden in the future.  
The next section, after explaining the EU fiscal framework in detail, depicts the 
EU‟s recent experiences with fiscal rules, emphasizing the euro area case. It shows that, 
in reality, even after the introduction of fiscal rules, public finances in great number of 
euro area countries still suffer from severe imbalances. Additionally, the major 
drawbacks, challenges and insufficiencies inherent to rules are analysed, implying that 
they are a somewhat incomplete institutional solution to fiscal profligacy. 
 
3.1 The case of European Union countries 
In 1992, the European Union (EU) adopted the Maastricht Treaty. By that time, 
the EU was composed of the 12 countries from the former European Economic 
Community (EEC). However, since then, 15 new countries have joined the EU, which 
presently comprises 27 Member States. In terms of economic integration, the EU is a 
single market – notably, the EU allows for people, goods, services and capital 
originating from one of the 27 Member States to move freely throughout all the other 
Member States. The Maastricht Treaty has been amended three times, in 1997 with the 
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Amsterdam Treaty, in 2002 with the Nice Treaty and recently in 2007 with the Lisbon 
Treaty. Together, these form the Treaties of the European Union. 
In 1999, an Economic and Monetary Union was established and, in a step towards 
greater economic integration, 11 of the 15 EU countries adopted a single currency, the 
euro. On the 1
st
 of January, 2001, Greece also joined the euro area. Since then, five 
other European countries have joined the euro, making it the official currency in 17 
countries. 
Belonging to the euro area implies a number of rights and obligations for Member 
States as well as creates some perverse incentives. In this regard, three fundamental 
implications are worth noting since they directly affect all the Member States‟ economic 
policy powers. The first implication concerns the loss of control over national monetary 
policy. Euro area countries‟ national monetary policies are delegated to the Eurosystem, 
which is the group of all Member States‟ national central banks and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the supranational entity that coordinates them. The mission of the 
ECB, and of the Eurosystem as a whole, is to assure and maintain price and financial 
stability within the euro area.  
Secondly, another particularly relevant implication concerns euro area Member 
States not fully internalizing the costs of their debt accumulation, but rather sharing 
these with their fellow Members. In the literature, this phenomenon is often termed 
international externality resultant from fiscal policy. It results from the possibility of 
having highly indebted countries trying to seek relief from their debts by lobbying the 
ECB to use the inflation tax, despite the effects that would be borne by their partners. In 
the EMU, national economies are closely linked and share the same monetary policy, 
and so the costs of the monetization of debt (related to inflation) are not borne entirely 
by the undisciplined country but rather by all other Member States as well. Krogstrup 
and Wyplosz (2009) model this international externality as a „partial international 
transfer of debt burdens‟. Ultimately, this phenomenon, per se, creates incentives for the 
accumulation of debt beyond what is beneficial for welfare, that is, it causes deficit bias 
[Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999)].  
The third implication refers to fiscal policy, particularly the set of fiscal 
constraints imposed on countries that adopted the euro (and also to the other EU 
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Member States that did not). Countries in the euro area have to agree to be fiscally 
disciplined by sticking to a Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP is a rules-based 
framework aimed at coordinating the national fiscal policies in the EMU, and its 
primary objective is to safeguard sound public finances, crucial to the smooth 
functioning of the EMU. The SGP, as part of the EU fiscal framework, is essential in 
ensuring, in the short and medium-term, that the Member States‟ national fiscal 
positions will be sustainable in the long run. The European Commission and the 
European Council (Council) are the main bodies monitoring the Member States‟ 
compliance with the SGP.  
Article 126 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (formerly article 104 in 
the Maastricht Treaty) lays the foundations for the EU concept of domestic fiscal 
discipline, establishing the legal basis for the rules in the SGP and for the procedure that 
operationalises their enforcement – the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The SGP 
formula has not been static over time; it suffered a major reform in 2005 and, nowadays, 
the political developments within EU economic governance are reshaping some of its 
elements. Thus, alterations in the SGP (particularly in its fiscal rules), in other EU 
arrangements or in the Treaty itself, are to be expected. For example, recently, on the 
30
th
 of January, 2012, 25 out of the 27 EU Member States formally agreed to adopt and 
incorporate a „golden rule‟ into their national legislations aimed at restricting annual 
government deficits to 0,5% of GDP in order to maintain their domestic public finances 
structurally close to balance. This new rule aims to address structural budgetary deficits, 
namely deficits that are corrected from the cyclical component and that do not account 
for one-off or temporary measures. Notwithstanding any other developments that may 
emerge in the near future, it is worth explaining the SGP‟s existing core fiscal restraints 
that are compulsory to Member States.  
In general, the SGP consists of two main impositions on Member States. The first 
requirement is to comply with a 3% of GDP deficit threshold. This limit restrains only 
conjuncture budgetary deficits and not structural deficits, unlike the „golden rule‟ that 
has recently been approved. The second imposition is that government debt must not 
exceed 60% of GDP or, if it does, it must be approaching the debt limit „at a satisfactory 
pace‟. In 2010, though, it has been decided that the pace of the debt reduction has to be 
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within a pre-determined numerical benchmark. The debt rule was recently made fully 
operational and put on equal footing with the deficit criterion [EC (2011)]. 
The SGP may be divided in two fundamental arms, a preventive and a dissuasive. 
The preventive arm of the Pact requires Member States to submit their annual budgets 
and medium-term stability or convergence programmes to the EC and the Council. This 
enables the country‟s government to demonstrate the way in which it is going to 
safeguard a sound domestic fiscal position and, in addition, is a helpful opportunity for 
the EC and other Member States – through the Council – to assess and comment on the 
country‟s domestic fiscal policy at EU-level. Traditionally, many of these EU-level 
comments, assessments and discussions on the Member States‟ fiscal policy have been 
made ex post, namely after the execution of the annual budgets and medium-term 
programmes. It was only recently, that this process was rescheduled to happen both ex 
post and ex ante, allowing some time for the EC and the Council to issue all the 
necessary recommendations and for the countries in question to incorporate the 
consequent adjustments before closing the budget bill. This new framework, proposed 
by the van Rompuy Task Force, will permit deeper fiscal coordination at EU-level 
[Council of the European Union (2010)]. Additionally, in 2010, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted some proposals from the EC aimed at reinforcing 
the European economic governance. One involves the introduction of Medium Term 
Objectives (MTOs) for the Member States‟ budgetary balances, underpinning the 
preventive arm of the SGP. These objectives are set in structural terms, that is, they are 
cyclically adjusted in order not to be altered by the estimated economic cycle or by one-
off and temporary measures [EC (2011)]. This permits both the EC and the Member 
States to assess the latter‟s domestic fiscal position in order to, in a dynamic fashion, 
periodically adjust the relevant budgetary items and ensure that the MTOs are met. 
Besides that, in order to accompany the introduction of MTOs, the adoption of a multi-
annual perspective in national fiscal planning was also made compulsory. Another 
recent policy measure that fits in the preventive arm of the Pact was to make it 
mandatory for Member States to adopt a set of minimum requirements and standards 
with the purpose of improving the quality of all administrative levels within national 
budgetary frameworks.  
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A more muscled arm of the SGP, the dissuasive arm, is operationalised by the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The EDP is triggered whenever a Member State is 
in non-compliance with the rules in force, and it follows a sequence of steps. The first 
step happens even before an excessive deficit has been completely diagnosed. Thus, 
before likely unconformities between domestic fiscal policy and the SGP‟s mandatory 
thresholds, i.e., if the country‟s fiscal position is outside the perimeters imposed by SGP 
rules, a procedure is formally opened and an „early warning‟ is issued for the 
undisciplined country. The subsequent steps of the EDP may include recommendations, 
requests of adjustments and/or mandatory corrections on the Member State‟s fiscal 
policy. Eventually, if the required measures are not implemented in time, the procedure 
may then comprise of sanctions or pecuniary fines (only for euro area countries), 
although only under a joint decision of the EC and the Council. The sanctioning and 
fining process can be thought of as being part of a third arm of the SGP, the most 
muscled of the three: the corrective arm. The corrective arm derives from the dissuasive 
arm and is operationalised when, even after all the steps took along the Procedure, the 
country remains incompliant with the rules. The process of sanctions has been 
strengthened in 2010 by the introduction of a sequence of progressive financial 
sanctions kicking in at an earlier stage of the EDP. In addition, nowadays, the euro area 
countries may also be required to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of 0,2% of GDP 
in case they do not comply with the deficit or debt rules in force. Lastly, as a sign of 
renewed economic governance at the EU level and in order to prevent and correct 
Member States‟ macroeconomic and competitiveness imbalances, the EC has recently 
implemented other new surveillance and enforcement mechanisms [EC (2011)]. 
It should be noted that the recent developments in EU economic governance have 
been, in part, the consequence of a history of ineffectiveness of the European fiscal 
framework. For instance, the 2005 SGP reform took grasp of the relatively undefined 
EU fiscal framework up until that point. One can divide the history of the Pact in two: 
before the 2005 reform, and after. The pre-2005 SGP had several flaws that some 
Member States took advantage of. For example, the implementation of the EDP was too 
complex, and was thus ineffective. The debt rule was not enforced, as it had no 
sanctions associated with it, which meant that in practice it was not considered binding. 
The incentives for the pursuit of healthy domestic fiscal policies were thus poor [EC 
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(2004)]. Nonetheless, even before the introduction of the Euro, there were, in the 
literature, suggestions of measures for establishing sound incentives to national fiscal 
discipline that would have increased the degree of effectiveness of the SGP. For 
example, regarding the effectiveness of deficit constraints, Inman (1996) suggested they 
should be exceptionally costly to amend, must use ex post deficit accounting and be 
constitutionally grounded, should be enforced by open and politically independent 
review panels or courts with sufficient powers to apply significant sanctions for 
violations, etc. Ultimately, the line of reasoning was that, in the absence of these 
features, the SGP would be hardly enforceable which, indeed, proved to be right. 
Despite meeting the criteria of a good fiscal rule, fostering the adoption of time-
consistent policies (which helps to remedy deficit biases), and contributing to the 
promotion of fiscal discipline across the EU, in practice, the pre-2005 SGP record 
denies its putative beneficial effects. Annett et al. (2005) argue that there were key 
problems with the enforcement and national ownership of the rules. The EC (2004) 
viewed the problem from a different angle, arguing that the Pact suffered from 
excessive stringency, which eventually led some Member States to ignore it. The SGP‟s 
disproportionate rigidity was also criticized by Wyplosz (2005), who suggested that the 
pre-2005 SGP underestimated the necessity of Member States being able to adapt to 
unforeseen contingencies if and when its rules became counter-productive.  
The fact is that before 2005, fiscal behaviours were not at all improved but, 
instead, deteriorated with the introduction of the Monetary Union and the SGP [IMF 
(2004)]. In fact, the tipping point of the EMU‟s SGP occurred in November 2003 when, 
disregarding the recommendations of the Commission, the European Council decided to 
„suspend‟ the sanction procedure where France and Germany, incompliant with SGP 
rules, were both facing an EDP. Numerous economists labelled this suspension ruinous 
and deadly to the effectiveness of the Pact mainly because it set a dangerous precedent 
that gave leeway to other countries to also breach the SGP rules
1
. In this regard, De 
Haan et al. (2004) suggested that making the decision to deploy the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) dependent on political will has, per se, constituted one of the main 
causes for the discredit of the SGP. This conclusion was confirmed by the results of 
Beetsma and Debrun (2007). Hence, it is believed that the suspension of the sanctions 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, De Haan et al. (2004). 
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helped provoke the EU „fiscal failure‟ which in turn, to some extent, boosted the 
deterioration of public finances of many euro area countries that culminated in the 
current sovereign debt crisis some of them are facing. 
At any rate, a major reform to the EU‟s fiscal framework arrived in 2005. It 
consisted of some revisions in the Pact‟s regulations and reformulations of 
interpretations of the Treaty. Ultimately, both the preventive and the corrective arms of 
the SGP were relaxed
2
. The reform thus addressed the EC (2004) and Wyplosz‟s (2005) 
worries about the Pact‟s excessive stringency. In a lucid analysis, Eichengreen (2005) 
pointed out that while the 2005 SGP reform was a step towards more flexibility, it 
eliminated the existence of enforcement powers. For that reason, it was easily 
predictable that the EC‟s influence on national fiscal policies would be more limited 
after the reform and that most of the necessary mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
the SGP‟s fiscal rules would be absent thereafter. Eichengreen (2005) thus refers to the 
Euro project as a monetary success but a fiscal failure. Counting the cases where euro 
area countries disrespected the deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP imposed in the SGP 
demonstrates this so-called fiscal failure. Accordingly, Table 3.1 shows us how many 
times Member States had excessive deficits between 1999 and 2011, based on reviewed 
and updated data.  
There are some disturbing post-EMU trends one can identify.  For instance, since 
2008, the year of the world financial crisis, most euro area economies have experienced 
successive public finances imbalances and thus breached the 3%GDP deficit threshold. 
This indicates that the crisis, at least to some extent, provoked a decrease in their public 
revenues and/or expansions in their domestic public expenditure. In practice, most EMU 
Member States have had to „feed‟ their domestic economies and financial systems while 
facing diminishing revenues due to their poor output growth since 2008. In addition, a 
remarkable number of breaches of the deficit ceiling also happened before the 2008 
crisis. For example, in 2003 and 2004, half of the euro-zone member countries had 
excessive deficits. One has to bear in mind, though, the effects of the world economic 
slowdown after the events of September 2001 in the USA, which affected Europe as 
well. In any case, all the breaches to the Pact observed in Table 3.1 cannot be simply 
                                                          
2
 See Loureiro (2008) for a review and criticism of the 2005 reform of the SGP. 
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justified by external factors. Instead, they are the consequences of the continuous fiscal 
imbalances – partly due to structural aspects but largely resulting from governmental 
misuse of fiscal discretion – of many European countries. Nevertheless, given their 
participation in the EMU, the question is: how have they managed to breach the rules so 
often? As suggested earlier, perhaps the rules were not binding – at least not binding 
enough – and/or the rules were not properly enforced.  
 
Table 3.1 – Excessive deficits (> 3% GDP) in euro area countries, 1999-2012 
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria      X     X X X X 
Belgium           X X X X 
Cyprus           X X X X 
Estonia               
Finland  X X X    X X X     
France    X X X    X X X X X 
Germany   X X X X X    X X   
Greece   X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Ireland  X        X X X X X 
Italy   X X X X X X   X X X  
Luxembourg X X X      X X     
Malta          X X X X X 
Netherlands     X      X X X X 
Portugal   X  X X X X X X X X X X 
Slovakia           X X X X 
Slovenia           X X X X 
Spain          X X X X X 
Sources: European Commission / AMECO  
Notes: Crosses show that, in that year, the country had a fiscal deficit exceeding 3 percent of GDP. Crosses relative to 
2012 are EC forecasts. Grey fields indicate that the country, at the time, was not a member of the euro area.   
 
In view of these facts, the ineffectiveness of the SGP is clear. Indeed, the Pact has 
been overly reliant on politics rather than on independent/automatic procedures, namely 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. As emphasized by Burda and Gerlach (2010), a 
major determinant for the failure of the Pact was the lack of consequences for countries 
that broke the fiscal rules. The SPG has been feeble, for a number of years, in enforcing 
rules and sanctioning undisciplined Member States, and has given too much leeway for 
undisciplined governments to circumvent it, note Beetsma and Debrun (2007). 
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However, besides the procedural and political reasons, fiscal rules may also have 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Pact.  
In economic terms, the efficiency of rules remains highly debatable. Especially in 
the EMU, numerical fiscal rules have some weaknesses and problems that may have 
helped undermine the success of the SGP. The first problem is that rules may encourage 
procyclicality. This is typically the case of simple deficit or debt ceilings as those in the 
SGP [IMF (2004)]. The EC (2006a) itself acknowledges the existence of a „certain 
trade-off‟ between fiscal rules and stabilization in good times. The reason is that deficit 
and debt rules are not able to deter major expansions in upswings since they have no 
way of forbidding procyclicality in „good times‟. On the other hand, during downturns 
such rules lead to procyclical contractions, which, apart from helping compliance, may 
have a negative effect on the economy as well. Thus, rules are more binding in bad 
times than in good times - exactly the opposite of what they should be in order to 
promote countercyclicality. In this way, such rules continue to allow overspending and 
under-saving or, in other words, excessive budgetary deficits like those observed 
throughout the last decade in euro area countries. However, not all types of rules 
encourage procyclicality and deficits; the EC (2006a) stresses that budget balance rules 
applied „over the cycle‟ and instrument-specific rules may contribute to reducing the 
risk of procyclical bias. 
Rules may not be easily enforceable either, mainly because there are not feasible 
mechanisms of surveillance and enforcement (at least independent ones), and also 
because there are ways for governments to effectively evade them by, for example, 
utilizing strategies of non-transparent and/or distorted public accounting practices. On 
the one hand, fiscal opacity allows politicians to escape democratic control, opening the 
path to harmful overspending and growing debt. Opacity may be divided into three 
dimensions: deficient information on budget documents and government accounts, no 
clear rules about whom in government is responsible for what in the budget process and 
vague economic assumptions underlying budgetary decisions [von Hagen (2010)]. On 
the other hand, governments often use other strategies in order to uncover the real 
situation of public finances, such as creative accounting and off-budget operations. 
Koen and van den Noord (2005), von Hagen and Wolff (2006), Kappeler and Nemoz 
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(2010), Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010) and von Hagen (2010) are among the works 
that focus on these subjects. 
Creative accounting refers to the unorthodox treatment of general government 
operations that actively affect the fiscal balance or public debt without these appearing 
in the public finances data as government expenditure. A type of creative accounting 
that has recently proliferated amongst European governments is to remove some overly 
resource-consuming items off the general government budget in order to make the 
domestic economic scenario seem more appealing. One classic example is the one of 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); since the 1990s, these partnerships have proliferated 
in some countries and have changed the way public investment is traditionally 
accounted for (England, Spain and Portugal are examples). In a PPP a private entity 
substitutes the government in buying and operating an asset at the cost of the former 
selling the corresponding services to the latter for a predetermined period. This may 
seem efficient but, in practice, what happened in many of the countries that invested 
through PPPs was that their governments only adopted this channel in order to reduce 
the initial budgetary deficit/public debt associated with the investments in public 
infrastructures. It seems obvious that being over-reliant on PPPs is comparable to credit-
dependency. In this way, in practice and at least to some extent, such governments have 
constrained their public finances. Along the same vein, governments routinely have 
hidden liabilities. For instance, some governments have guaranteed risky debts of State 
agencies and large companies that did not account for the deficit thus contributing to a 
deterioration of their fiscal positions.  
Related to creative accounting is the use of one-off measures. In several countries 
these are joint practices. One-off measures are non-recurrent government decisions that 
affect net lending or borrowing for one or a few years, but not permanently. For 
instance, the privatization of a public company represents a one-off measure, as all the 
financial flows and other proceeds resulting from the sale operation are unique, i.e., they 
only happen once. Another example is the incorporation of private pension funds into 
the public social security system. This operation allows the government to have a 
massive one-off intake in exchange for the responsibility of paying the associated 
pensions from then on. For an anxious government worried about complying with the 
ceilings imposed by the SGP, the attractiveness of this operation lies in having welcome 
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oxygen supply today that only has to be paid for over the subsequent years. The EC 
(2004) recognizes some sizeable one-off measures in a number of countries of the EU. 
Oftentimes, these measures have served to divert the scrutiny of the EU institutions and 
other Member States. At any rate, the key problem with using one-off measures is that 
they do not solve the structural problems of the economy. 
Having explained policy gimmicks, it is important to realize the extent to which 
numerical fiscal rules are exposed to and evaded through them, in order to understand 
how they contribute to fiscal indiscipline. The literature on the subject states that if a 
government is myopic and impatient so that it values its present consumption more than 
the long run maximization of the society‟s welfare, then a numerical rule will only 
tempt the government to better hide its borrowing and not to incur less debt. Thus, the 
general idea is that the more binding numerical fiscal rules are – especially deficit rules 
– and the weaker their enforcement mechanisms, the more likely an undisciplined 
government is to engage in non-transparent practices and opaque accounting strategies. 
Besides, as noted by von Hagen and Wolff (2006), in the scenario of a clear absence of 
political will for discipline and where rules are the only disciplinary mechanism over 
fiscal policy, creative accounting and off-budget operations will probably flourish, 
undermining transparency and diluting democratic control over the budget. There is in 
fact evidence of creative accounting in EMU Member States and of a clear overlooking 
of SGP rules. Further confirming this observation is the fact that, historically, the 
deficits of Member States only partially explain the evolution of public debt levels. 
Hence, this corroborates the hypothesis that governments attempted to circumvent fiscal 
rules through creative and other highly non-transparent accounting practices.  The 
implication then is that the lack of transparency allowed politicians to freely pursue 
their own interests rather than those of the country. Consequently, the levels of spending 
grew higher and imbalances surged in many EMU countries. 
 
3.2 Institutional reform 
The limitations inherent to rules prevent them from being a complete solution to 
fiscal profligacy and, in particular, to reverse the situations of deficit bias. This applies 
to any country and, of course, to euro area countries. Yet, not only rules but also the 
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current institutional fiscal framework as a whole has proved unsuccessful. It reflects 
deficient economic governance both at national and EU levels. Eventually, fiscal 
performance and fiscal discipline in the euro area will only be enhanced with stronger 
and better-designed fiscal institutions, able to improve the incentives of policy-makers 
[Ter-Minassian (2002)]. In a nutshell, both the national and the EU-level fiscal 
frameworks must be strengthened on fronts other than fiscal rules and, therefore, a 
sizeable institutional reform is required. 
Before detailing what an institutional reform involves, however, it is important to 
dismiss any other potential alternative.  
Sometimes cited in the literature, the only available alternative to institutions 
enforcing discipline within public finances is financial market regulation. This type of 
regulation concerns the disciplinary effect on fiscal outcomes that markets have via 
interest rates. The reasoning behind is that markets price the debt of a country in 
accordance with its perceived ability to repay. Typically, therefore, when it comes to 
borrowing money in the markets, an undisciplined country will be penalized through its 
interest rate in comparison to a disciplined one. It thus follows that when the fiscal 
position of a country deteriorates, it will have to bear a higher interest rate than in the 
case where its fiscal position is stable or is perceived as healthy by capital markets. 
Furthermore, an important notion related to the markets‟ expectations is that investors 
typically believe that as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio of a country increases, its ability 
to pay its debt decreases. Accordingly, capital markets are expected to signal the 
deterioration of a country‟s fiscal position with an increase of its interest rate, which, 
indeed, is confirmed by recent evidence. Even so, the problem lies deeper, in the fact 
that market pressures may not be sufficient to deter undisciplined countries from 
pursuing profligate fiscal policies – a fear confirmed by the historical records of interest 
rates of those EMU countries that are now dealing with sovereign debt crisis. The 
explanation then, as in Hauner and Kumar (2006), is that most of the time the increase 
in interest rates applied to undisciplined countries is far from what is necessary to force 
the country to improve its fiscal position, for example. This, in itself, reduces the role of 
financial markets as an alternative to institutions. Nonetheless, the mark-ups in markets 
interest rates usually allow sharp-eyed market spectators to distinguish disciplined from 
undisciplined countries.  
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It is also worth noting that market discipline is likely to be weaker in the EMU, 
where credit spreads and ratings may not substantially penalize Member States‟ fiscal 
profligacy [Hauner and Kumar (2006) and Balassone et al. (2004)]. This is well 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 of the previous chapter, which displays minimal mark-ups in 
long-term interest rates of some EMU countries until 2008. There, it is crystal clear that 
the differences in the public finances of the four countries were not duly reflected in 
interest rates. Even so, in 2009/10, at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, long-term 
debt interest rates eventually boomed for Greece, Ireland and Portugal – just before 
their request for EU/IMF rescue – reaching unimaginably high levels (in the Greek case, 
the interest rate hit figures close to 30%).  What happened? Evidence lead to the 
conclusion that only in the face of extreme scenarios in which a country will definitely 
not be able to service its debt (or when most investors believe so) and when no 
financially healthy third-party country is firmly willing to back the sinking country are 
the markets prone to applying a risk premium that is sufficiently high to pressure the 
government into correcting its fiscal conduct. At this time, the risk premium is largely 
unaffordable to the already over-indebted country, and it may give rise to situations of 
imminent or actual bankruptcy. In summary, market discipline over fiscal policy works 
indeed, but it works much too late [Bayoumi et al. 1995]. Thus, the upshot is that, given 
the fickleness of capital markets, market regulation is of little help when it comes to 
creating permanent mechanisms to foster fiscal discipline. 
An institutional reform can be defined as the creation of new and/or a 
reorganization of existing institutions in order to enable them to deliver a set of 
projected objectives. However, there are various types of fiscal institutions, which 
makes this concept difficult to define. The list of bodies, procedures and rules that 
match the possible concepts of fiscal institutions is considerable. Besides, the nature of 
fiscal institutions also varies according to the role one wants them to have. For example, 
they may be established at the EU level and nationally, as well as regionally or covering 
any other relevant domain. As a result, talking about fiscal or budget institutions in 
general may be vague and imprecise. Thus, it is worth further clarifying the range of 
budget institutions.  
Traditionally, in the literature, fiscal institutions involve rules, procedures and 
independent bodies. Nevertheless, other budget institutions are often referred to by a 
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number of authors. For instance, in Fabrizio and Mody (2006) budget institutions are 
defined as forms of self-imposed control by fiscal actors in view of improving the 
quality of decisions. They can be defined as different mechanisms and rules of the 
budget process united by the same objective: influencing fiscal outcomes. Institutional 
structures of the budget process may influence outcomes by helping to determine the 
strategic choices and behavioural incentives of politicians. Ter-Minassian (2002), in 
turn, considers that the main institutional components of a fiscal framework are fiscal 
rules, transparency, fiscal laws and fiscal councils. Lienert (2010) also emphasizes 
fiscal responsibility laws. The EC (2006b), on the other hand, refers to „domestic 
budgetary institutional settings‟, which include the procedural rules and structures of the 
budgetary processes, the numerical fiscal rules constraining the discretionary powers of 
policy-makers (for both EU and national-level rules), and independent bodies or 
institutions providing input and formulating recommendations in the area of fiscal 
policy. In brief, in any discussion about the reform of fiscal institutions, one has to 
consider there is a wide range of institutions that may serve a wide range of purposes.  
An institutional reform to promote fiscal discipline in an EMU will have to 
happen both in the Union as a whole and individually within each Member State. 
Nevertheless, reforms at a European level cannot be identical to reforms in domestic 
fiscal frameworks, although they should be complementary. 
At EU-level, the weaknesses of the SGP and other fiscal framework 
insufficiencies mentioned above have recently triggered a process of comprehensive 
economic governance reinforcement. The European Commission acknowledged the 
necessity of strengthening the EMU‟s fiscal framework in order to anchor 
macroeconomic stability and the sustainability of public finances, two essential 
preconditions for achieving growth and jobs. To achieve this, the SGP needs to exercise 
its role as the main catalyst of EU fiscal policy co-ordination. Particularly, SGP‟s rules 
have to be strengthened and a more comprehensive macroeconomic surveillance has to 
be implemented in order to enhance the fiscal discipline of Member States. 
Nevertheless, the disconnect between European and national policy processes has to be 
addressed seriously, and all Euro-wide reforms will have to be complemented with 
provisions within national fiscal frameworks [EC (2010c, 2011)]. 
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At a national level, fiscal frameworks should comprise of effective and well-
designed institutions aimed at promoting a sound fiscal environment conducive to 
growth and prosperity. The European Commission defines these frameworks as: “The 
set of elements that form national fiscal governance, i.e. the overall system of 
arrangements, procedures and institutions that underlies the planning and 
implementation of budgetary policies” [in EC (2010a), p.73]3.  
A strong fiscal framework enhances domestic economic governance. Therefore, in 
order to restrain governments‟ spending and overcoming deficit biases, there are some 
important factors to consider when reforming national fiscal institutions. First, fiscal 
objectives, targets and rules should be clear, measurable and must cover all levels of 
government comprehensively. For example, specific expenditure caps could be applied 
to all levels of government. Secondly, fiscal policy should be governed by a set of ex 
ante guidelines in line with the government‟s preferences. For instance, the government 
could specify how and when discretionary powers should be used for stabilization 
purposes and explain what fiscal instruments should be used in case of economic 
recessions and of booms. A third ingredient concerns the commitment to transparency. 
In order to be effective, a domestic fiscal framework needs to be based on fully 
transparent public accounting processes associated with free, timely and complete 
availability of transparent, reliable and independent fiscal information, data and 
statistics. Moreover, forecasting systems must work properly and be realistic. Fifth, it is 
vital to create sound incentives to avoid deviations from policy objectives, which may 
be achieved by creating mechanisms/channels that increase the political or reputational 
costs for governments that depart from those objectives. Finally, Member States should 
agree upon some standards for domestic fiscal frameworks. These include, for example, 
the use of top-down budgetary processes and/or the creation of public bodies mandated 
to provide independent analysis, assessments and/or forecasts on national fiscal policy 
[Council of the European Union (2010) and Calmfors (2010b)]. 
Above and beyond these factors, however, a reform of national fiscal institutions 
always has to focus on adopting or modifying rules and independent bodies.  
                                                          
3
 According to the EC, the main elements of a national fiscal framework are numerical fiscal rules, 
medium-term budgetary frameworks for multiannual fiscal planning (MTBFs), budgetary procedures 
governing the preparation, approval and implementation of the budget and independent public institutions 
intervening on budgetary policy issues. 
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Although rules have failed in the task of solving fiscal profligacy, they have some 
usefulness in restraining governments and they may have a role to play if some 
conditions are satisfied. Krogstrup and Walti (2007) argue that rules are still a useful 
policy tool for fiscal discipline in that they still do help to discipline budgetary 
outcomes. Moreover, national fiscal rules may be a useful complement to EU-level 
rules. If they are at least as strict, domestic fiscal rules may provide support for the 
SGP‟s fiscal commandments. Nonetheless, it is important that the introduction of 
domestic rules obeys proper criteria. In order to put them into effect, rules have to be 
well-anchored to domestic policy-making at all government levels, and have to provide 
clear benchmarks allowing the measurement of performance of the country‟s fiscal 
policy with respect to transparency and accountability. Moreover, it is also crucial to set 
out consequences in case of non-compliance. These may not necessarily be pecuniary 
sanctions but have to involve, at least, deterrent costs to reputation. Rules are defined by 
the costs one incurs when trying to evade them, argues Debrun (2007). Therefore, it is 
crucial to determine mechanisms that inflict costs on national policy-makers when they 
bypass, change or thwart rules. Further, if such rules are numerical, it would be highly 
beneficial to clearly specify their escape clauses in detail, along with a detailed list of 
circumstances that may trigger them and the procedures that relate to them. Complex 
escape clauses help ensure compliance in „normal‟ times [EC (2011)].  
Independent bodies are another key piece for fighting fiscal indiscipline. The 
concept of independent bodies is, per se, very wide. In the context of fiscal policy, these 
are often viewed as domestic or international institutions, to a large extent independent 
from the political sphere, that contribute by some means to the normal course of fiscal 
policy and the budget process. Their remit can vary and their mandated tasks differ 
widely from one another. So, bearing in mind that an institution is an element that 
somehow actively influences fiscal policy, one can apply the term „independent body‟ 
to an array of entities ranging from a statistics production institute to a court of auditors 
or to an economic research department of a University, for example.  
Each country‟s institutional environment depends on its culture and traditions, and 
includes rules, independent bodies and/or other elements. Consequently, reforming 
domestic fiscal frameworks is, to some extent, country-specific; there is no one-size-
fits-all fiscal framework and, thus, the same bodies, rules and regulations will not solve 
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every country‟s problems [Ter-Minassian (2002)]. Thus, each country must diagnose its 
own problems and come up with the necessary political will to solve them. Here, EU 
institutions must put in some additional effort to persuade Member countries that some 
reforms will de facto result in a healthier fiscal framework, both domestically and 
internationally. The EU political debate on institutions remains too sloppy, even as 
some Member States are struggling with sovereign debt crises. Historically, however, 
Member States have often proven to be receptive and even pro-active in adopting 
reforms, for instance on measures to enhance transparency and monitoring within the 
budget process [EC (2010a]. In contrast, there traditionally has not been as much 
political will when it came to centralizing the budget process or to adopting top-down 
budgeting, when in fact changes like these are likely to entail significantly positive 
disciplinary effects on fiscal policy. 
Ultimately, the scenario of high and rising debts of some euro area Members, 
menacing risks of sovereign default in some of those countries, and great instability 
within financial markets has to be inverted, particularly through the action of policy-
makers, both at European and at national levels, that have to react and (re)shape new or 
existent budget institutions. As rules alone are insufficient, a domestic institutional 
reform should also include the creation of national independent bodies in charge of 
providing inputs and formulating recommendations in the area of fiscal policy [Beestma 
and Debrun (2007) and EC (2006b)]. Besides, these institutions could play an active 
role in enforcing compliance with the SGP, thus becoming a useful complement to EU-
level policies. A growing debate in the economic literature and within some decision-
making instances at EU and national levels increasingly suggests that not all types of 
independent bodies are appropriate for these roles. Nonetheless, the introduction of 
independent fiscal agencies is one of the most popular suggestions for reform, and it has 
been frequently put forth as a must-have component in national fiscal frameworks.  
Consequently, besides rules, decision-makers should focus on agencies. 
According to the EC (2006b), these can be designed to complement and/or substitute 
fiscal rules, which make them a possible key remedy to fiscal indiscipline. Therefore, 
the basis for sound and sustainable national public finances may be a rules-based fiscal 
framework complemented by some sort of independent fiscal agency. Hence, hereafter, 
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the main focus of this dissertation will be on independent agencies – other budget 
institutions are beyond the scope of this work. 
A growing number of economists believe that independent fiscal agencies can 
effectively address some of the causes of fiscal indiscipline and deficit persistence in 
many euro area countries. Importantly, the idea of independent agencies has been 
mentioned and endorsed by the EU institutions, the OECD, the IMF and a substantial 
number of renowned individuals in the field
4
. Thus, it is worth defining these agencies 
in order to know how they can enhance the existing fiscal frameworks. There are two 
main definitions one can use. The first is from Debrun et al. (2009) that divides 
independent fiscal agencies into Independent Fiscal Authorities (IFA) and Fiscal Policy 
Councils (FPC), and the second is from Wyplosz (2005) that divides independent fiscal 
agencies into a hard and a soft version of fiscal councils, corresponding to the Debrun‟s 
IFA and FPC, respectively
5
.  
A general definition of FPCs can be found on Simon Wren-Lewis‟ webpage 
devoted to publicizing FPCs: “The term Fiscal Council is generally used to describe an 
institution, funded by but independent of government, which provides public advice on 
fiscal issues. (…) [one may] restrict the term to include only institutions that provide 
macroeconomic advice on the likely course of national budget deficits, but these same 
institutions may or may not also provide detailed microeconomic costing of the 
budgetary impact of particular projects or proposals”6. 
One of the major differences between IFAs and FPCs is that the former are given 
decision-making powers over some fiscal variables. This means that IFAs have 
statutory powers, delegated by elected politicians, in order to control fiscal variables 
and/or to impose certain measures within specified contingencies. Some authors, such 
as Wyplosz (2005), call IFAs the hard version of FPCs. 
                                                          
4
 There are a number of articles that endorse the idea of establishing national independent fiscal agencies. 
See, for example, ECB (2010), European Commission (2006a, 2009, 2010b, 2010c), Council of the 
European Union (2006, 2010), European Council (2010a,b), van Rompuy (2010), Hagemann (2010), 
Wyplosz (2002, 2005, 2008), Annett et al. (2005) and Debrun et al. (2009). 
5
 Henceforth, and for the most part of this work, the definition/taxonomy given by Debrun et al. (2009) in 
regard of independent fiscal agencies, authorities and councils is going to be followed. Alternatively, the 
terminology in Wyplosz (2002, 2005, 2008) will also be mentioned. 
6
 See http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/simon.wren-lewis/fc/Fiscal_Councils.htm. 
40 
 
Among economists, independent fiscal agencies are commonly interpreted as 
functioning in parallel with rules. Thus, the general belief is that both rules and agencies 
can play their role against fiscal profligacy without overlapping each other. Some 
authors refer to a number of complementarities, including EC (2006a, 2010b, 2011), 
Debrun (2007), Beetsma and Debrun (2007), Calmfors (2010a), Calmfors and Wren-
Lewis (2011a), Fatás and Míhov (2010) and Lane (2010). 
A prior note before exploring the main areas of complementarity between rules 
and agencies, as discussed in Debrun (2007), is that even if a government do implement 
some restrictive fiscal rules, it may not be predisposed to setting up institutions to 
facilitate their enforcement, implying that it may have planned to never have to comply 
with the rules. Nevertheless, agencies are always able to contribute to a more effective 
enforcement of fiscal rules.  
A possible contribution of independent agencies may be to monitor governments‟ 
compliance with rules in a timely and effective manner. As the effectiveness of a fiscal 
rule depends on its monitoring, the whole process may be improved if it is carried out 
by a third-party, non-politicized institution. This body could even issue suggestions in 
order to optimise the design of the rule itself. Hence, it could be possible to delegate the 
task of optimally creating, implementing, enforcing and/or monitoring compliance with 
fiscal rules to an IFA. In addition, a soft version of the agency (a FPC) could also report 
on and publicly inform voters about the cases in which the government was incompliant 
with fiscal rules, as well as stating in detail how they were circumvented and asking the 
government for explanations. FPCs monitoring the government‟s adherence to fiscal 
rules would reinforce the enforcement of rules. A council may also spot the 
government‟s attempts to dabble in creative accounting – which, as seen earlier, may be 
prompted by strict rules – and publicly denunciate them.  
Additionally, rules give councils a benchmark against which to evaluate 
government policy. In this sense, numerical rules can define the country‟s fiscal policy 
objectives, thus facilitating the work of independent institutions. Among the possible 
features that could arise from this „joint-venture‟, it is worth noting that, in the context 
of the preparation and implementation of a budget, an independent agency can assess 
whether budgetary plans and developments are in line with the rules. 
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Besides, the complementarity between fiscal rules and agencies is manifest as 
they potentially focus on different aspects of government finances and as their time 
orientation is different. While numerical rules tend to have a short or medium-term 
orientation and often apply to sub-sectors of government, agencies typically analyze 
government finances as a whole from a long-term perspective. 
 “More elaborate monitoring by an independent institution can allow a fiscal rule 
to be more flexible” [in Calmfors (2010a), p.13]. There are benefits in allowing FPCs to 
advise the government in the case of an economic shock. We know that a simple fiscal 
rule like a budget balance rule do not take into account that an economy has good and 
bad times since they are as binding in good as they are in bad times. However, during 
economic downturns, it would be positive to have a comfortable budgetary margin for 
the government to steer the economy back on to the right track. In this sense, some sort 
of „constrained discretion‟ as to when rules should be adapted by independent fiscal 
bodies could be beneficial. The incorporation of an element of independent judgment 
into the fiscal framework would boost the effectiveness of rules by permitting a suitable 
management of the trade-off between fiscal discipline and fiscal discretion/flexibility. 
Hence, FPCs could be able to monitor whether economic shocks are the one and only 
motivation for deviations from fiscal targets and rules. Another possibility could be to 
institute complex rules that are explicitly contingent to economic shocks. However, 
these complex rules may not be easy to monitor. Nevertheless, an FPC could play a role 
in monitoring complex and sophisticated fiscal rules as well. 
There are still a number of other situations where a fiscal agency can complement 
a rule or vice-versa. For one, an FPC may boost the effectiveness of national rules by 
providing independent analytical inputs, macroeconomic forecasts and other 
assessments. It may also issue penalties in case of non-compliance and it may control 
and decide on the escape clauses of the fiscal rules, namely by ensuring that these are 
only triggered in case of shocks of sufficient severity. A clear relevant example of a 
council‟s response to a real necessity of an escape clause is the one of the Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council. After the 2008 recession, this council advised the Swedish 
government to depart from the rules in place in order to allow for more discretionary 
fiscal expansion and therefore fight the economic slowdown. This confirms that IFAs 
and FPCs may be designed not only to constrain fiscal policy-making but also to help 
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manage the trade-off between long-run fiscal discipline and short-term fiscal flexibility. 
In other words, these agencies are useful in the promotion of long-run fiscal 
sustainability and solvency, allowing, at the same time, for the necessary flexibility to 
stabilize output in the short-term. 
There are also some other proposals in the literature related to complementarity 
between rules and independent fiscal institutions. One of them is from Inman (1996) 
who, within the EMU context, suggests the delegation of judiciary power to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to monitor compliance with the Balanced Budget Rule. 
The author argues that, in this way, the rule would become absolutely compulsory for 
all Member States. Additionally, the ECJ would also have statutory power to impose 
sanctions and severe penalties on the incompliant countries. Krogstrup and Wyplosz 
(2009) make a different type of proposal, this time regarding optimal fiscal frameworks. 
They argue that the social optimum would be achieved if the optimal annual deficit 
ceiling could be externally estimated and set every year. In this case, there would not be 
a fixed fiscal rule. Instead, a fairly sophisticated, domestic, and non-partisan fiscal 
agency would ensure that the government commits to applying public spending to 
productive investments only. This would guarantee success in eliminating the common-
pool problems related to unproductive spending. No country has adopted these original 
ideas yet but they are further confirmation of the perceived complementarity between 
rules and independent fiscal agencies. 
Finally, an interesting finding is that the majority of the already-established 
councils work alongside national fiscal rules [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011b)].  
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4. Independent fiscal institutions 
 
Among economists, there are different perspectives about what the design and 
remit of independent fiscal agencies should be, and the literature comprises proposals 
often only slightly different from one another
1
. In order to simplify the analysis, some 
of the articles have offered different ways of categorizing proposals. For our purposes, 
the main focus will be on the conceptual definition given by Debrun et al. (2009) – IFAs 
and FPCs. 
Delegation of power over some aspects of fiscal policy to agencies is likely to 
improve their ability to influence fiscal outcomes. Thus, as happens with the delegation 
of monetary policy to an independent central bank, an Independent Fiscal Authority in 
control of a part of fiscal policy-making may effectively promote transparency, 
depoliticize the macroeconomic policy framework, and/or help ensure long-run 
sustainability and solvency while allowing for some fiscal flexibility to stabilize the 
output in the short-term. On the other hand, if decision-making powers are not delegated 
to agencies, their capabilities of restraining the government are diminished. Even so, 
FPCs may be able to exert their influence through a range of other channels. It should 
be noted here that all currently established agencies are fiscal councils and that no IFA 
solution has passed from theory to practice yet. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first section explores the 
fundamentals of delegating fiscal policy, notably in analogy with monetary policy and 
independent central banks. A survey of the literature behind the proposals for IFAs and 
an explanation of why they have not been adopted by any country so far are also 
provided. The second section is devoted to explaining FPCs, namely their goals, remit, 
mandate, composition and others. It also offers some considerations related to the 
important determinants of a council‟s success, such as ways of assuring independence, 
and explores the proposals in the literature, also including fiscal councils at European 
level. 
 
                                                          
1
 For a survey see, for example: Debrun et al. (2009), European Commission (2006b), Debrun and Kumar 
(2008), Von Hagen (2010). 
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4.1 Independent fiscal authorities (IFAs) 
In order to understand the usefulness of IFAs, one must first understand the 
fundamentals of policy delegation. Maskin and Tirole (2004) present an interesting 
model detailing circumstances in which it is beneficial to allocate decision-making 
powers to non-elected officials. Their main argument is that given the possibility that 
elected representatives do not maximize the average citizen‟s utility (social welfare) but 
rather their own preferences (or a mix of the two), there are cases where it may be 
socially beneficial to delegate powers to non-elected judges or bureaucrats. These cases 
include situations when the electorate is not properly informed and literate about policy, 
when it is costly for the electorate to acquire decision-relevant information, or when 
there is sluggish feedback about the quality of policy-makers decisions. Here, the 
delegation scenario may be desirable, namely by instituting a body that is not 
completely democratically accountable and placing some technical decisions under the 
control of a set of appointed bureaucrats. One should bear in mind, however, that the 
authority of non-elected officials would necessarily have to be more limited than that of 
elected ones. 
Additionally, the delegation of policy is only justifiable when some criteria are 
met. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) explore how the socially optimal allocation of policy 
tasks between politicians and bureaucrats may be achieved. First, delegation to 
bureaucrats is preferable when the object of delegation is technical tasks that require 
more skills than effort, or when there is uncertainty about whether the policy-maker has 
the necessary abilities to perform the tasks. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that a 
politician will not be completely receptive to delegating redistributive policies to 
independent agencies. Given that a delegated authority can criticize the government‟s 
actions and inflict political costs, it is not obvious why a government would want to 
delegate policy in the first place. Nevertheless, assuming they do, a second question 
arises: what would prevent governments from withdrawing powers from a delegated 
authority in case of misaligned interests? As noted by Wren-Lewis (2011), under some 
circumstances, delegation may be sustainable from the governments‟ point of view. For 
instance, it is possible that the government chooses to delegate decisions as a 
commitment device (to a certain policy objective, for example). Furthermore, the 
political cost of overruling the previously created agency makes the commitment more 
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credible. Therefore, in theory, if the agency rigorously follows its mandate, then the 
necessary conditions for its sustainability should be in place. Another criterion for the 
success of delegation is that there are socially harmful distortions in policies 
implemented by the political representatives. Otherwise, there is no gain from 
delegation whatsoever. Finally, delegation should not entail major policy coordination 
problems because if it does, the benefits created by delegation may be outweighed by 
the costs of non-coordination. 
However, when it comes to fiscal policy delegation, different opinions often 
emerge in the literature, either in favour of or against it.  
The idea of taking some fiscal policy-making decisions away from elected 
politicians in order to address the problems of excessive domestic fiscal indebtedness 
started to gain momentum in the literature in parallel with the success of monetary 
policy delegation to independent central banks (ICB). Before this success, though, the 
process of getting endorsement for the idea of monetary policy delegation had been long 
and windy. Nonetheless, the works on that idea proliferated along with the persistency 
of an inflation bias in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Eventually, the near-
consensus was that monetary policy had to be under the control of an independent 
central bank and had to obey a medium to long-term rule (allowing, at the same time, 
for a minimal level of short-term discretion). Essentially, the success of this system is 
now widely acknowledged because low inflation rates have indeed been achieved, at 
least wherever an inflation targeting strategy was properly adopted [Krogstrup and 
Wyplosz (2006)]. As a result, when considering fiscal delegation, it is certainly useful 
to establish some of its associations with monetary delegation. 
Firstly, a clear similarity between fiscal and monetary policies resides in the 
general goal that they must achieve: stability. Naturally, the delegation of monetary 
policy aims at price stability much in the same way that fiscal policy delegation ought to 
attain fiscal discipline. Nevertheless, there are also differences between fiscal and 
monetary policy delegation. One of these concerns the control over policy instruments. 
Wren-Lewis (2011) recalls that central banks have always conducted money market 
operations and have always had a consultative role with the government regarding 
interest rates. So, it was little surprise when the task of fixing interest rates was 
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delegated to the – then independent – central bank. In contrast, in fiscal policy, given 
the huge amount of tax and spending instruments available, delegation is much more 
difficult. Still, it could be possible to mandate an independent body with the task of 
setting the government‟s annual deficit target. Even so, there is no analogous body for 
fiscal policy as there is the central bank for monetary policy, and thus there is not an 
institution to which these powers would naturally be delegated.  
Furthermore, another criticism often aimed at fiscal delegation is the scarcity of 
democratic accountability and questionable legitimacy of independent agencies. In 
short, creating an IFA implies that some important policy instruments have to be taken, 
permanently or temporarily, from a legitimate democratic body and handed to an 
unelected one. Therefore, in a democratic regime, it can be questioned from whom an 
IFA is given the authority to carry out fiscal decision-making, especially if it 
encompasses fiscal distributive consequences. The words „no taxation without 
representation‟ imply that even only delegating indirect control over some tax rates may 
be excessive. Even though this argument holds, it is not applicable to some proposals 
such as the one from Wren-Lewis (2003) of an IFA to which only limited powers to 
temporarily change a few fiscal instruments would be delegated. It remains to be 
assessed how much distributional impact this agency would exert in comparison with 
independent central banks in changing the interest rates. Moreover, there are 
mechanisms, such as the one von Hagen and Harden (1994) have proposed, that enable 
elected politicians to correct bad decisions and poor performances of IFAs. In such 
cases, the legislature, besides establishing the agency, may also have the right to dismiss 
it under pre-determined circumstances – that is, only when is truly justifiable and not 
because of political opportunisms. This is very important since it is probable that a 
conflicting relationship will arise between the IFA and the government, given that their 
objectives, incentives and judgment may tend to differ [Debrun et al. (2009)]. 
Calmfors (2003) provides another perspective, claiming that it is both possible 
and feasible to delegate a part of fiscal policy without giving rise to distributional and 
democratic legitimacy issues. If delegation mainly involves macroeconomic 
stabilization decision-making aspects, elected governments may maintain control over 
all decision-making that has distributional impacts such as decisions on the size of 
government, on the structure of long-run taxes and expenditure, and on the long-run 
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debt path. One criterion, then, seems to be that some more sensitive areas of policy, 
notably areas that serve primarily distributive objectives or that are highly dependent on 
social preferences, must remain on political ground [Debrun et al. (2009)]. In the end, if 
only some selected decisions were delegated to an agency, the government would still 
be held accountable for all of its fiscal decisions and the electorate preferences would 
still be represented democratically.  
In any case, some proponents of fiscal policy delegation suggest that whenever 
there is an underlying cause of deficit bias there may be a rationale for delegating fiscal 
policy. Here it would be useful to briefly review a few specific proposals in the 
literature. 
Although it has not yet been implemented, the idea of IFAs is not new. One of the 
earliest works proposing the creation of an IFA was of Blinder (1997), arguing, 
essentially, in favour of a relocation of powers from the political sphere to independent 
non-elected committees of technical experts. Besides comprehensively analyzing 
important issues surrounding the delegation of policy decisions
2
, Blinder (1997) argues 
that fiscal policy decisions of governments have become too political and have therefore 
discredited and weakened democracy. To overcome this problem, he argues that the 
experience of delegating monetary policy to independent central banks must be 
considered, notably by acknowledging that this delegation has often brought 
impartiality and independence to policy-making. Likewise, fiscal policy might be better 
situated on a less political ground. If some fiscal policy-making was to be made on non-
partisan, technocratic grounds by „appointed professionals‟, „best equipped‟ to make 
some specific decisions, some malfunctions would be corrected, suggests Blinder 
(1997). Hence, an independent tax authority could be created. Yet, determining the 
objectives and goals of such independent agencies would necessarily be a political task. 
Ultimately, the best fiscal framework would be the one that could find the right balance 
between delegation of powers and political intervention. Ultimately, Blinder‟s central 
question is not if delegation of policy is desirable, but rather how many and to what 
extent fiscal decisions should be delegated.  
                                                          
2
 Blinder (1997) analyzes the problems of government myopia and short-sightedness, the democratic 
legitimacy of delegation, and the moral and distributive aspects of policy, among others. 
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Another early proposal for quite a substantial macroeconomic reform in terms of 
reshaping and redesigning economic institutions comes from Ball (1997) who proposes 
the creation of a national institution with power to control, to some extent, both 
monetary and fiscal policy. Much in the same way, Gruen (1997) discusses the possible 
benefits of establishing institutional mechanisms that are able to detach the 
„determination of the overall stance of fiscal policy from day-to-day government‟. 
Gruen (1997) puts forward as ideal an independent statutory agency that would control 
some tax-related tariffs as a function of a pre-set taxation parameter. This parameter 
would be the institution‟s instrument to attain the objective of budget balance over the 
business cycle. 
Wyplosz (2005) has a slightly different view, proposing an IFA mandated by the 
government to set an annual fiscal deficit target that leads to compliance with a pre-
specified long-run debt target. Wyplosz (2005) believes that there are time 
inconsistency problems arising from the tensions between the objective of long-run debt 
sustainability and the necessity of short-run fiscal flexibility to ensure macroeconomic 
stability. Therefore, as fiscal policy needs both short-term room for manoeuvring to 
counteract unexpected shocks and a binding long-term plan for fiscal sustainability, an 
institution capable of managing this trade-off without jeopardizing any of those two 
objectives would be truly beneficial: “The challenge is to deliver on the short-run 
objective without giving up the long-run objective” [in Wyplosz (2005), p.73]. Again, 
ICBs have proven their effectiveness in solving the time inconsistency in monetary 
policy – they now efficiently manage the trade-off between short-run monetary 
flexibility and long-run price stability by creating incentives that allow short-run 
discretion to be constrained by long-run discipline. Hence, in order to overcome the 
deficit bias problem, „fiscal policy could be set in the same mould‟, argues Wyplosz. 
Specifically, with an IFA the short-run output stabilization objective could be 
effectively constrained by the long-run debt sustainability objective. It would allow the 
use of deficits for countercyclical purposes, guaranteeing, at the same time, fiscal 
discipline over the business cycle.
3
 
                                                          
3
 Wyplosz‟s proposal follows an earlier one – Wyplosz (2002) – which, similarly, argues in favor of the 
creation of fiscal policy committees mandated to impose a cap on the overall size of the budget deficit, 
while leaving the task of achieving the goal to governments. 
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In turn, Eichengreen et al. (1999), addressing the situation in Latin American 
countries, also suggest the creation of National Fiscal Councils with mandatory powers 
(such as FPCs in their hard version). This proposal was intended to solve some fiscal 
credibility and flexibility problems, notably by mandating the new bodies to control the 
maximum variability of public debt. Furthermore, National Councils would help ensure 
countercyclicality, serve as a pacifier for capital markets expectations, as well as create 
an environment of trust that would facilitate investment, borrowing and other 
macroeconomy-driven activities. Eichengreen et al. (1999) argue that such agencies 
would gain credibility from their record of political independence while retaining the 
flexibility characteristic of a people-based, as opposed to rules-based, institution. 
Besides, they could also help address the common-pool and commitment problems, as 
they would be able to rise above partisanship and to develop a reliable, long-term fiscal 
strategy. 
In Europe too, IFAs may have an important role in promoting fiscal discipline. In 
the EMU, fiscal policy is a particularly decisive instrument given the scarcity of other 
effective policy means of tackling domestic economic imbalances in the short to 
medium terms. Even so, when governments‟ activities are only driven by stabilization 
objectives, their ability to ensure fiscal solvency in the long-term may be compromised. 
Therefore, giving the role of fiscal stabilization to an autonomous agency may be 
helpful. In this regard, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) suggest that when fiscal policy is 
used primarily as a tool to stabilize the business cycle, delegating fiscal decisions to 
independent agencies is not too different from delegating the control of monetary policy 
to an ICB. Also, Wren-Lewis (2002) finds some major advantages in delegation. First, 
as this case clearly mirrors monetary delegation, it should share the relative success of 
ICBs. Moreover, it seems easier to take fiscal stabilization out of the government‟s 
hands rather than taking debt control. Such an agency would only need to temporarily 
control a limited number of relevant tax instruments – e.g. consumption taxes – in order 
to achieve maximum leverage over the key macroeconomic variables. Wren-Lewis 
(2002) reckons that even though the changes to those selected instruments would only 
be temporary, they would still permanently impact public debt.  
Moreover, Calmfors (2005) further proposes that, in the EU, the effectiveness of 
domestic fiscal frameworks is dependent on at least three components: well-defined 
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policy objectives, transparency and incentives to avoid deviations of government 
policies from pre-set objectives. Thus, national councils of independent experts should 
establish these incentives. They can also be charged with checking if ex ante objectives 
and ex post government policies are uniform, providing evaluations of policies, issuing 
recommendations and/or preparing forecasts. The tasks that such institutions can be 
mandated with entail variable degrees of direct decision-making. In extremis, these 
domestic IFAs could be given some central powers: “A far-reaching proposal would be 
to give the Fiscal Policy Council the power to veto political decisions on the annual 
budget balance, and possibly also on the size of government expenditures, when it 
considers them to constitute major deviations from the objectives pre-determined by the 
parliament” [in Calmfors (2005) p.12].  
IFAs may be designed to solve several political failures associated with fiscal 
policy. For example, delegation of fiscal policy to technocratic decision-makers may 
help avoid the ad-hoc – and often gravely short-sighted – methods sometimes used in 
the governments‟ fiscal decision-making processes. In fact, IFAs could fully focus their 
pre-set overall priorities on encompassing gains in efficiency [Calmfors (2003)]. Also, 
the delegation of (temporary) control over some specific taxes to independent agencies 
may be fruitful and preventive in the face of situations in which the current generation 
has a deliberate desire to exploit the coming generations. In any case, the upshot is that 
such institutions may help to better align fiscal policy with social preferences by 
constraining discretionary actions and eliminating some distortions in the political 
process.  
All the proposals and perceived benefits of IFAs have to be contrasted with the 
fact that no IFA has been established in any country to date. Some authors argue that 
their introduction is unlikely, at least for now [see, for example, Debrun et al. (2009)]. 
The idea of delegating control over tax rates and/or some items of government 
expenditure to unelected bodies, even if on a temporary basis, is not only a highly 
sensitive and controversial topic within the political sphere, but is also often 
emphatically neglected by politicians. Besides, all the parallels that may be drawn with 
the (successful) case of monetary policy delegation still have their boundaries and 
limits. In this respect, one should be mindful that there are some aspects of fiscal policy 
that are completely different from monetary policy and, although some of the monetary 
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policy associations may solidify the idea of fiscal delegation, these aspects generate 
obvious contextual differences between the two types of delegation. For example, the 
underlying causes of deficit and of inflation biases – i.e. the central motives for 
delegation – are fairly distinct. As a result, problem-solving in each case is also 
somewhat dissimilar since each problem needs a different remedy. For instance, an 
advisory ICB would, most likely not be able to eliminate inflation bias and time 
inconsistency in monetary policy, while a fiscal watchdog may be able to solve many 
informational problems by simply making information available to the public.  
Furthermore, not all conditions for fiscal delegation have been satisfied yet. First, 
as emphasized in the criteria formulated by Alesina and Tabellini (2007), before 
delegating, a general consensus on what constitutes sound policy has to exist. This aims 
to ensure first, that the agency‟s mandate serves the best interest of society and, second, 
that the agency can be held accountable for achieving all its pre-set objectives by using 
appropriate policy-making instruments. Indeed, while this consensus in monetary policy 
has been achieved (the consensus being that sound monetary policy is reflected by low 
and stable price levels), in fiscal policy the only consensus currently found is that debt 
should be sustainable. Thus, the objectives of fiscal policy concerning debt are far from 
being as clear as the objectives of monetary policy. In fact, while most developed 
economies tend to have similar implicit or explicit national inflation targets, their debt-
to-GDP ratios are far from similar.  
Secondly, economists have still not decided on a number of political economy 
issues that remain uncertain, which raises problems when fiscal delegation is under 
discussion. For example, different opinions arise about debt policy: it is unclear if it is 
best to target debt – and if so, what the target should be or what the optimal level of 
sovereign debt is – or if debt should follow a random walk. Moreover, the speed at 
which some debt threshold should be achieved is also controversial. The central 
question, though, resides in fiscal sustainability, often appointed as the primary 
objective of IFAs. The fact is that sustainability, per se, is not enough to guide fiscal 
policy on an annual basis [von Hagen (2010)]. One may think of the intertemporal 
budget constraint as a threshold for measuring policy; however, the constraint only 
implies that public debt must not grow faster than „the long-run rate of interest net of 
the long-run real rate of growth of the economy‟ forever. Anyhow, there are countless 
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paths for debt that ensure the government‟s compliance with the intertemporal budget 
constraint, as Wren-Lewis (2011) points out. Hence, the constraint is completely silent 
about policy adjustments, that is, it does not lay out the path fiscal variables should 
follow in order to achieve a sustainable fiscal position.  
However, monetary policy delegation is not a trouble-free solution either. 
Castellani and Debrun (2005) find that delegation of monetary policy to ICBs may 
include distorted incentives to governments. To some extent, in the face of output cuts 
driven from monetary restraints, governments may tend to use expansionary fiscal 
policy to stimulate output growth. This suggests that it is possible that, instead of being 
annihilated, the inflation bias is merely relocated from monetary to fiscal policy (in the 
form of a deficit bias). In this way, some time-inconsistency problems may be 
transferred, again to some extent, from monetary to fiscal policy, resulting, in due 
course, in enlarged deficits. Therefore, it is possible that a partial reform of 
macroeconomic institutions – both monetary and fiscal ones – only reshuffles policy 
distortions instead of correcting them, thus affecting the execution of macroeconomic 
policy, state Castellani and Debrun (2005). The remedy may be to impose effective 
limits on fiscal discretion, and an IFA can be mandated to do so.  
Finally, despite all of the problems and limitations associated with it, complete 
absence of delegation of fiscal policy to independent bureaucrats is somewhat awkward. 
Four explanations for this stand out. The first is that there are real possibilities of fiscal 
delegation giving rise to some implementation problems [Wyplosz (2008)]. Secondly, 
the time devoted to the political economy debate about delegation is still insufficient. 
There is a need for a longer discussion in order to reach a broad consensus on the 
desirability of such an institutional reform before the delegation of (some) fiscal 
decisions to independent bodies can become a reality [Calmfors (2003)]. Third, in 
countries where monetary policy is already independent – or centralized in a 
supranational entity such as in the euro area – governments are usually particularly 
resistant to delegate control over fiscal variables as well. Finally, the major obstacle 
against the delegation of fiscal decision-making is the lack of political will. On this 
matter, Wyplosz (2008) comments: “(…) the proposal [for the creation of an IFA] asks 
the culprits to put in place an arrangement that will not just bind them [the elected 
governments], but will also force them to take full responsibility for identifying a debt 
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target and uphold the policy implications as set forth by the FPCs [hard version]” [in 
Wyplosz (2008) p.29]. From that perspective, such proposals are indeed naïve.  
At this point, one may ask if it is possible that the soft version (FPC) be a first 
step to the implementation of the hard version of agencies (IFAs). The answer seems to 
be yes. In fact, over the last decade, many governments have been committing to fiscal 
discipline and finding ways to eradicate the deficit bias problem. In this sense, is not 
unreasonable to expect that, eventually, these same countries will find the idea of an 
IFA more attractive in order to fight fiscal profligacy. Besides, some countries have 
recently established FPCs, which may indicate that they are moving towards IFAs. 
Similarly, Kirsanova et al. (2007) claim that if the council‟s assessments and positions 
are typically followed and are considered helpful, there should be a predisposition from 
both policy-makers and voters to delegate some fiscal powers to the FPC. 
Ultimately, in spite of all their advantages, the barriers associated with IFAs imply 
that, at the moment, they do not represent a real institutional alternative/complement to 
rules fighting fiscal indiscipline. A less intrusive solution is probably more appropriate - 
fiscal councils could be a valuable and helpful alternative. Hereafter, the discussion will 
only focus on the soft version of agencies that do not involve delegation of control over 
fiscal decision-making. It should be noted, however, that in terms of effectiveness, 
having an advisory agency might be different from having a decision-making one.  
 
4.2 Fiscal policy councils (FPCs) 
In general, the basis for the establishment of FPCs has already been laid out in this 
essay. Even so, in order to underline their potential role in eradicating fiscal 
indiscipline, there is still a need to detail the form and content of the councils‟ solution 
to the problem. 
A possible definition of an FPC is provided by Hagemann (2010): “At its most 
basic level, a fiscal council is a publicly funded entity staffed by non-elected 
professionals mandated to provide non-partisan oversight of fiscal performance and/or 
advice and guidance – from either a positive or normative perspective – on key aspects 
of fiscal policy” [in Hagemann (2010), p.5]. The primary objectives of a fiscal council 
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are to promote fiscal discipline, notably condemning fiscal indiscipline, revealing its 
causes and pointing out the way towards a sustainable fiscal policy. Nevertheless, as 
fiscal councils are unable to directly solve the political failure that intrinsically causes 
fiscal indiscipline they cannot be considered complete solutions [Wyplosz (2008)]. 
Councils can only try to mitigate and possibly eliminate the implications of that failure. 
Without political failure, disciplined politicians would always conduct policy in order to 
maximize social welfare. Indiscipline would simply not be an issue and fiscal discipline 
would be compulsory within all levels of government. However, as the political failure 
persists, councils provide the possible solution. In this section FPCs will be 
characterized in detail and will be analyzed in order to provide an overview about when 
and how they can help tackle fiscal indiscipline and deficit bias. 
The idea of FPCs is not new, although it has only recently gained momentum in 
the political communities of a number of countries. One of the first councils to be 
established was the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), founded 
in 1945. Another example is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the US. 
Established in 1974, it is the largest council to date, and is mandated to provide the 
Congress with: “(…) objective, nonpartisan, and timely analyses to aid in economic and 
budgetary decisions on the wide array of programs covered by the federal budget and 
the information and estimates required for the Congressional budget process” [from the 
CBO website
4
]. As in the CBO, independent evaluation of fiscal policy is the core task 
of a majority of the other already established councils. However, the form in which 
evaluation is conducted and provided to voters may vary from one institution to another. 
Depending on the economic, political and historical context of each country, there is a 
wide range of motives for establishing an FPC. There are as many motives as there are 
problems driving fiscal indiscipline, and so different councils in different countries may 
perform different tasks when working towards the objective of ceasing indiscipline,.  
Right from the outset, the approach and methods the council should follow have 
to be explicitly and minutely defined and mandated by the government or Parliament. A 
clear and thorough statutory position and mandate are essential for the council‟s 
survival and success. In this sense, it should be determined if fiscal policy is going to be 
                                                          
4
 See http://www.cbo.gov/. 
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assessed ex-post and/or ex-ante and if in a positive and/or normative manner. In 
addition, if permitted by the legislature and in order to strengthen incentives for fiscal 
discipline, some FPCs may also be mandated to supply normative judgments and 
recommendations, for example by evaluating fiscal policy against the government‟s pre-
set objectives. Sometimes, FPCs also actively participate in the budget process by 
helping to prepare the macroeconomic framework underlying the budget, giving advice 
of various types, issuing credible fiscal projections and macroeconomic forecasts, and 
providing assessments of specific policy measures (e.g., social security sustainability 
studies or analyses of the economic sustainability of the public healthcare system) 
[Annett et al. (2005)]. Notwithstanding, even when FPCs are mandated to deliver 
recommendations and analyses, all decision-making over fiscal policy – namely final 
decisions on budgetary targets and the fiscal stance – remains within the government‟s 
sphere. This ensures that governments alone are responsible for decisions on fiscal 
policy [see Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011b) and EC (2010b)]. 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to shed some light on the goals councils want to 
achieve. Typically, councils evaluate whether the policies pursued (and/or projected) by 
governments are sustainable in the middle and long runs. Following this evaluation, 
councils use a number of channels to influence policy outcomes. If deemed credible and 
well-reputed by the public, a council has the ability to steer government fiscal policy to 
sustainability. For example, it can publicly highlight deviations of government policies 
from their optimal path, thus creating, per se, reputational costs for the government. 
Also, a council can be given a „watchdog role‟ consisting of providing unbiased 
information to the electorate, helping them judge the government‟s fiscal policies with 
accuracy and impartiality [Kirsanova et al. (2007)].  
Fiscal councils may also be of help in addressing problems of fiscal opacity, 
particularly by promoting transparency in fiscal policy and within the fiscal framework. 
Along a similar vein, independent agencies can help reduce the consequences of 
asymmetric information between voters and policy-makers by publicly explaining what 
the public finances look like and how the tax payers money is being used – namely on 
which projects and policies [Debrun and Kumar (2007) and von Hagen (2010)]. A 
mandate like this would allow the credible conveying of impartial information to the 
public about the economic outlook of the near and medium-term future. Hence, as 
56 
 
privileged observers of economic and political developments, FPCs could detect and 
denounce non-transparent tendencies in the government and the budget process. This 
scrutiny creates incentives for governments to respect an acceptable code of conduct 
within fiscal policy. Besides, these institutions can also be effective in increasing 
governments‟ accountability towards voters by raising awareness – both in voters and 
politicians – of the long-run costs of current deficits. Thus, one of the FPC‟s greatest 
assets lies in media and public attention insofar as it is allowed to leverage its role of 
raising awareness. Also, an FPC‟s assessments may play an important role in enriching 
and informing the public debate about relevant fiscal issues, including within the 
national Parliament. 
Foundationally, the usefulness of a council depends on a clear definition of what 
it is intended to do, notably its remit, the scope of its activity and its mandate.  
The remit of a fiscal council concerns the issues on which the FPC will have to 
focus its attention and the economic objectives it should pursue and try to achieve. 
Usually, the remit of councils lies in performing advisory and/or monitoring tasks. 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a) identify a set of four possible core activities of a 
FPC: „ex-post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets in the past‟; „ex-
ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its targets in the future‟; 
„analysis of the long-run sustainability and optimality of fiscal policy‟ and „analysis of 
fiscal transparency‟. Notwithstanding, the scope of the remit can vary. Not only could it 
include aspects of fiscal policy – as in the Belgian and Canadian Councils – but it could 
also cover employment, growth and other areas – as is the case of the CBO in the USA. 
The mandate of an FPC, on the other hand concerns its specific and periodic tasks and 
role in the budgetary process. These tasks may include publications, reports, projected 
variables and issuance of recommendations, analyses and/or other inputs for the budget 
process. An FPC can also have other formal obligations such as time-scheduled reports, 
regular hearings in the parliament, specific data production, forecasting activities, and 
considerations about the budget proposals, among others. A fiscal council must have a 
clear and unambiguous mandate, which should include the regularity with which the 
tasks assigned are to be performed. Importantly, whatever the council is directed to do – 
all of its tasks as well as the scope of all its activities – has to be widely recognized by 
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politicians and voters in order to ensure the council is both accountable and protected 
[EC (2010b)].  
In addition, as fiscal indiscipline can result from several different causes and 
varies by country, it must be ensured that domestic FPCs seek to address the particular 
problems that exist in their countries, notably by adapting their remits and mandates to 
the problems one wants them to solve. In support of this notion, von Hagen (2010) 
states that the design and powers given to a domestic FPC depend on what is causing 
fiscal indiscipline in each country. The experience of having a fiscal council cannot be 
transferred from one country to another unless their underlying problems are the same. 
Therefore, before anything else, a clear understanding of the individual fiscal problems 
of the country is vital. Only then is it possible to empower a council to perform the tasks 
that would properly address them. For instance, a country with an extensive record of 
biased forecasts and without any reliable institutional provider of forecasts and 
economic assumptions perhaps should call on its domestic FPC to provide forecasts. On 
the other hand, if the country already has a meritorious forecast provider but instead 
does not comply with fiscal rules and often undervalues fiscal sustainability issues, it 
should perhaps establish a council that would mainly highlight the importance of fiscal 
discipline and somehow monitor compliance with fiscal rules. 
Moreover, the tasks an FPC can be assigned depend on other aspects too. When it 
comes to establishing a council, one has to bear in mind the institutional environment of 
the country in order not to duplicate responsibilities and tasks. The current fiscal 
situation, the culture, the tradition and the institutional arrangements that already exist 
in the country are specific features that influence the array of tasks a council may be 
mandated to perform. Additionally, the remit of a council must fill the country‟s need 
for quality research. However, if there is already a strong national academic tradition in 
producing high quality scientific content about domestic fiscal issues, it would probably 
be redundant for the FPC to do the same. Besides that, institutional frameworks usually 
vary from one country to another; even when they are similar there are always relevant 
differences that remain. The extent to which existing institutions are independent from 
the government, their reliability and perceived quality of their analysis, the fiscal history 
of the country and the institutions‟ past work, all contribute to the disparity. 
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Another central aspect of councils relates to the budget and resources that support 
their activities. When one estimates the resources a new FPC may need, it is important 
to consider first the scope of the activities the council is performing. First, we ought to 
anticipate what the regularity of the studies produced by the council is going to be (e.g. 
quarterly, semi-annual, etc.). Some existing councils, such as the Swedish FPC, publish 
reports at least twice a year but there is not a clear benchmark on what shall be the 
minimum/maximum regularity in which the council must produce reports. Then, one 
should consider the complexity of the tasks and analyses assigned. For instance, it is 
important to consider if the evaluations are of a general nature or instead, if they are 
more detailed and/or if the FPC is mandated to produce analyses upon request, etc. It 
should be acknowledged that these extra activities consume resources. Lastly, the 
variety of subjects under scrutiny is also important. Should the FPC have a unique focus 
on, for example, macroeconomic forecasts, or, on the contrary, should it also analyze 
employment, growth, and other fiscal issues? Thus, when establishing a council, policy-
makers have to mindful that the scope of activities indeed influence the need for 
resources (human and financial), the composition, and the likely design of a council 
[Calmfors (2010a,c)]. 
The modus operandi of an FPC is also a crucial determinant for the success of its 
activities. As noted by the EC (2006b), three possible frameworks emerge: positive 
analysis, analysis against benchmarks and normative analysis. Councils that conduct 
positive analysis are usually forecasters of macroeconomic and budgetary variables, and 
statistics providers. Typically, their main aim is to improve the quality of the stream of 
information that underpins fiscal policy-making. Even though they cannot assess policy 
against benchmarks, they are still able to make positive assessments, carry out studies 
on a number of fiscal issues and/or perform costing analyses of policy initiatives. 
Sometimes, this kind of councils are able to somehow circumvent the limitation of not 
being able to assess policy against benchmarks by assessing the impact of two or more 
alternative policies thus leaving to the public the task of choosing the one they find best 
– as done by the CBO in the USA, for example. 
Moreover, FPCs that deliver analyses against benchmarks are those that 
independently monitor fiscal developments besides evaluating a number of fiscal issues. 
These councils may perform ex ante evaluations of whether fiscal policy will meet its 
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targets/rules or not. Alternatively, they can evaluate ex post if the policies have met 
their pre-set targets/rules. Lastly, in addition to normative analysis, some fiscal councils 
also issue recommendations and statements about the governments‟ policy.  
One might ask which framework suits best, but the answer is not clear. 
Nevertheless, following Calmfors (2010b) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a, 
2011b), some useful considerations can be made. A first note refers to the minimum 
positive analysis that a FPC should perform: at the very least, a council must report on 
the economic consequences of the government's policy. The second is that there is a 
risk, which cannot be ignored, that the normative recommendations could compromise 
the positive analysis. Therefore, when defining the mandate of a council, one must be 
mindful of the fact that there are tasks that, when carried out together, are counter-
productive as they may give rise to conflicting goals. For example, a council producing 
forecasts and, at the same time, making ex post evaluations and issuing policy 
recommendations, may produce biased evaluations of policy. Thirdly, existing FPCs 
differ in the amount of normative advice they provide, and about half only provide 
positive analysis. This diversity may reflect the multiplicity of countries‟ political 
environments, the differences in domestic institutional frameworks, and the range of 
problems and needs associated with fiscal policy among countries. Fourth, there is no 
consensus about what tasks a council should perform beyond engaging in policy 
evaluation and sustainability analysis. There is no obvious pattern for combining 
additional tasks. In the end, it is likely that normative evaluations and recommendations 
would carry more weight than positive analysis because with the former, the public has 
a clearer benchmark to judge policy against. 
An additional question involving remits and mandates is the trade-off between a 
narrow and a wide remit. A broader remit has the advantage of producing valuable 
inputs for the conduct of policies. For example, it can cover growth, ageing, 
employment and development. Moreover, a wide remit helps to raise the general quality 
of the economic policy debates. Studying different fiscal subjects also results in 
synergies as it helps councils to reach more fundamental conclusions about policy as 
well as to be more aware of the overall fiscal scenarios. On the other hand, having too 
much to do entails a risk of subtracting crucial political and public attention (in addition 
to the human resources) from the primary objectives of the FPC. Ultimately, it needs to 
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be remembered that these objectives were the ones that lead to the establishment of the 
council. 
The quality of the activities conducted by a council is also directly dependent on 
the capabilities of those who carry them out. Therefore, the composition of an FPC is as 
important as its remit and mandate. A number of relevant conditions have to be met 
when deciding on the council‟s composition: the board of directors, their background 
and the background of the council‟s staff, the appointment procedures, the length of the 
term in office, the compatibility between the member‟s responsibilities and their 
political positions, the size of the secretariat, and the voting procedures are all aspects 
that deserve consideration. In this respect, the example of ICBs is valuable. Central 
banks provide an essential benchmark when it comes to strategies of ensuring 
independence of labour, and of reaching effectiveness in meeting policy objectives and 
fulfilling mandated tasks. In the literature, the majority of deliberations about the 
composition of councils are based on the examples of ICBs. Among the authors who 
have studied the composition and independence of councils are Fatás et al. (2003), 
Kirsanova et al. (2007), the EC (2006b, 2010b), Calmfors (2010b), Rogoff and 
Bertelsmann (2010) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a). Some of the pertinent 
questions will now be discussed. 
Which professionals should run the FPC? Typically, an FPC has a secretariat or 
staff (varying in size) and a board of directors (or executive committee) that aim to help 
and advise the Chairman in managing the council‟s internal and public activities as well 
as protect him from attempts of political capture or other interferences. Both the 
council‟s directors and staff cannot be randomly picked from the labour market; their 
recruitment and appointment, respectively, must respect a basic rule of independence, 
which is that they must not have been involved in politics (for at least some time). 
One may identify five possible sources of people that may be integrated into an 
FPC. A first possibility is academic researchers because of their presumed 
independence and expected fresh research perspectives. They are probably the best 
choice. In turn, public finance experts from various levels of government administration 
may also be included when some expert knowledge about detailed assessments of 
budget bills is necessary. A risk with these specialists is that they may be focused on the 
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prospects of a future career in government administration and thus, they may have some 
incentives to consider the government‟s preferences instead of the preferences of 
society as a whole. Alternatively, the council‟s composition may include analysts from 
the private financial sector. In this case, however, the catch is that they may have 
possible loyalties to their former or future private employers. In addition, the council 
could hire former politicians who benefit from widespread recognition of merit. The 
advantages are that ex-politicians know the system, and if the council combines people 
from different parts of the political spectrum, its credibility may be enhanced. In 
contrast, a major risk is that their analyses may be restricted by earlier positions they 
have taken in public. Finally, another possibility is to invite foreign personalities who 
may help assure the council‟s independence and impartiality towards the domestic 
political environment. The recently established Portuguese Council, for example, have 
included two foreigners within the five members that compose the board of directors, 
the German Jürgen von Hagen and the Hungarian George Kopits
5
. 
How should the members be appointed? The appointment of the Chairman and 
board members must follow some sort of specific and predefined procedure that ensures 
the board‟s functional independence. The appointment procedures must be grounded in 
guaranteeing professionalism as opposed to political preferences. In line with this, the 
parliament and/or other domestic independent institutions can recommend and/or 
nominate the governing body of the council. The government may also have a say in 
this process. For example, it may be asked to approve the appointed members of the 
council. Some authors argue that the appointment of members should be done by 
independent entities, such as the ICB, or by the council itself. Some degree of 
government involvement in the procedure may give rise to more political costs in case 
the government does not follow the council‟s recommendations afterwards. However, in 
terms of independence, too much involvement may be dangerous. In short, the 
appointment process must be designed such that it helps to guarantee independence, 
merit, technical expertise and credibility. 
What is the appropriate length for the term in office? This is also variable. For 
example, in Belgium and in the UK the period in office is five years, in Denmark three, 
                                                          
5
 See Barbosa et al. (2011) and Diário da República (2012). 
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and in Sweden it is currently one. In any case, as the elements of the council are to be 
completely independent from the political sphere, assigning the council‟s decision-
making body long, fixed-term, non-renewable periods in office (as in central banks) 
may be an effective means of ensuring independence and impartiality. 
How many people does a council need? The dimension of the staff of existing 
FPCs is diverse. While the Slovenian FPC has no permanent staff at all and its 
appointed members play their part in the council‟s activities in parallel with their 
current professions, the CBO has 230 members of staff. However, a council‟s secretariat 
usually comprises of 15 to 40 professionals. Moreover, the relationship between the size 
of staff and the remit is unclear. Nonetheless, the number of technicians needed tends to 
be related to the level of detail involved in the council‟s analyses and assessments. At 
any rate, it is vital to secure the absolute minimum of human capital needed to perform 
all the mandated activities. Therefore, it is crucial to introduce formal arrangements 
ensuring that the government will not reduce the council‟s staff or fire its members at 
will whenever it finds it „politically convenient‟ to restrain the activity of the council. 
This kind of under-resourcing can compromise the soundness of the council‟s 
assessments, evaluations and/or forecasts and, eventually, can completely subvert the 
council‟s raison d’être. 
Other concerns about councils‟ independence. When it comes to independence, 
there are some other important notes to take, namely some lessons that can be learnt 
from ICBs. A first basic rule for independence is that the council cannot take any 
directives from the government or any other institution. This means that the council has 
to be formally and informally insulated from all kind of government‟s interferences, 
especially backstage actions and/or non-transparent contacts. Thus, contacts between 
the FPC and the government should always be institutional and transparent, and not 
behind doors. Second, the independent development of frameworks, analyses and 
concepts has to be formally assured. Ideally, FPCs should be free to independently 
judge and question the governments‟ policies and assumptions. Councils should also 
have the freedom to initiate the studies and investigations they believe necessary instead 
of only responding to requests for information from the legislature. Finally, a last 
premise for reinforcing the independence of fiscal councils is to hold them accountable. 
Not holding a council accountable in the short-run may risk its long-run independence. 
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Given the likely conflicts the FPC and the government may have, it is prudent to ensure 
that the council‟s work is evaluated regularly so that the government is deterred from 
restricting its independence or reformulating its tasks.  
The supervision of councils is not a subject of consensus among authors. The 
question of which body, if any, should supervise the national council by acting as 
principal in a principal-agent relationship, is not easily answerable. Nevertheless, a 
number of options have already been employed in different countries, denoting that this 
is a choice that greatly depends both on the countries‟ political system and on the 
countries‟ exposure to international organizations. 
Accountability can be established in many ways. As noted by Calmfors and 
Wren-Lewis (2011a), a fruitful way of making FPCs accountable may be to establish 
international standards ruling their activity. This would also imply an added political 
cost for governments in case they wanted to attack the FPCs‟ independence. Similarly, 
Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010) propose that councils could be monitored by an 
international agency – such as the IMF, for example. Such monitoring could assess and 
provide multi-dimensional ratings of the FPCs‟ performance. Alternatively, a more 
formalized international network of councils could be established. Further, in case 
international supervision is perceived as insufficient, Lane (2010) proposes an 
accountability framework based on a two-track process, where the council testifies and 
reports to the national parliament on a regular basis and is also periodically audited by 
an international expert group. Lane is not alone in endorsing the parliament supervision 
idea, as other authors also consider that having the parliament as the council‟s principal 
could enhance independence Notwithstanding, regardless of the type of supervision 
chosen, it always has to be carefully designed from the outset as limits and boundaries 
should be accurately defined and placed. For instance, it should be determined that the 
right of dismissing a council or any member of its board must only be made in very 
specific circumstances, and only if approved by a qualified majority within the 
Parliament. On the contrary, some disagree on having the parliament as a council‟s 
principal but, instead, suggest that the government could be a wiser choice. At any rate, 
the supervision of some types of councils is less necessary. Von Hagen (2010) believes 
that for councils that are only mandated to improve transparency, for example, the 
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accountability of its members to their peers may be sufficient given that their peers‟ 
evaluation may affect their future career prospects.  
A recurrent argument from fiscal council sceptics refers to effectiveness. As 
previously mentioned, the effectiveness of a council depends on its ability to create 
reputational costs to the government in case it does not follow and/or consider the 
council‟s widely publicized recommendations and/or assessments [Calmfors et al. 
(2010)]. Notwithstanding, it is worth explaining in detail how a council is able to 
influence and steer fiscal policy-making towards sustainability. A few simple logical 
steps help explain the reasoning: first, the government‟s deviations from the optimal 
path of fiscal policy will be noted and condemned by the FPC. The government, which 
is rational, will anticipate this. Hence, the government, a priori, has to choose between 
being disciplined by following the correct policies from society‟s standpoint, i.e., those 
that lead to sustainability, or being undisciplined and pursuing its own personal and/or 
other private interests. If it chooses discipline it will be backed by the council and 
probably rewarded with the voters‟ appreciation; otherwise, it will be publicly 
condemned by the FPC and is likely to face voters‟ disapproval. This anticipation from 
the government, per se, will restrain the pursuit of its own interests rather than those of 
society.  
Nonetheless, a number of other factors are crucial to a council‟s effectiveness. 
Autonomy from the government, active public dissemination of analyses, visibility, 
credibility and a record of impartiality and objectiveness are some important conditions 
for its success
6
. In this respect, Calmfors (2010a) notes that in the long-term, the 
council‟s impact on policy depends on the quality of its work. On a daily basis, it is the 
reputation of the council that will grant it media attention in order to create pressure on 
the government, forcing it to pay attention to the council‟s assessments and 
recommendations. Thus, for fiscal councils, the media (and the internet) is a very 
important channel for feeding information to the public. In addition, FPCs must be 
credible, well-reputed and highly visible to the eyes of both political actors and the 
general public. Only a credible and well-reputed council would be able to influence 
public opinion and promote the debate. Besides, the more credible an agency is, the 
                                                          
6
 See Hagemann (2010). 
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more the government will pay attention to its assessments and analysis. As governments 
are usually not obliged to follow the councils‟ recommendations or to use its forecasts, 
if they still do, it is in part due to the trust they have in the institution. At the end of the 
day, a visible, credible and media attention-catching institution is more likely to 
influence budgetary outcomes and the quality of public finances than one that does not 
show those features. 
There is also a belief among economists that the effectiveness of councils is to a 
considerable extent conditioned by the government‟s cooperation and commitment to 
fiscal discipline. As noted by Hagemann (2010), the mere existence of a council is not 
sufficient. Instead, a „strong and sustained political commitment to a medium-term 
fiscal goal‟ and to the mandate of the FPC is critical. Fiscal councils are not „silver 
bullets‟ that eliminate fiscal profligacy forever. Without this commitment from the 
government, and lacking the necessary political will, the ability of a fiscal council to 
improve fiscal outcomes is uncertain. Conversely, when there is commitment and 
political-will towards fiscal discipline, one may think that the presence of a council is 
superfluous. Nevertheless, as governments come and go, a credible and durable council 
can still become an impartial and objective voice in promoting fiscal discipline across 
the legislatures. Good fiscal institutions are the key to achieving a healthy fiscal 
performance, and one of the FPCs‟ major tasks should be to constantly remind 
politicians and voters of the value of fiscal discipline and the costs of fiscal profligacy 
[von Hagen (2010)]. Besides, as argued by the EC (2006b), a high degree of ownership 
seems to be a key condition for the success of councils. The fact that the political forces 
have established the council, per se, increases the reputational costs for politicians of 
ignoring or bypassing the institution‟s analysis, recommendations or forecasts. Hence, a 
final upshot is that general support from most political parties for the activity of the 
FPC, especially before the establishment and during the first years of the council, is a 
determinant of the council‟s success [Mihályi (2010) and Calmfors et al. (2010)]. 
Also, when it comes to access to data and relevant information, councils will 
always depend, to some extent, on government‟s cooperation. In this respect, at the 
outset of the council, it is crucial to have the government/parliament explicitly declaring 
that, within the scope of its activities, the FPC will have complete access to true, 
reliable and timely information and data about public finances at all times. In addition, 
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when the council‟s mandate includes tasks such as forecasts and policy assessments, it 
should be given full access to internal information from the national statistical office, 
ministries and other governmental bodies [EC (2010b)]. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of councils is necessarily measured by correlating 
their activities with policy outcomes. It is worth explaining these correlations. Debrun 
(2007) studies the channels through which FPCs may be able to impact budgetary 
outcomes. An interesting finding is that these impacts are mainly achieved through 
improving incentives for fiscal discipline. Besides that, the greater the council‟s 
strictness with government‟s indiscipline and the larger the guarantees of independence 
from political interference, then the greater the likelihood is of actual impacts. Also, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between the „index of legal restraint‟ and the 
„guarantee of independence‟. This may indicate that when countries instituting these 
agencies are seriously committed to fiscal discipline, the council‟s effectiveness is 
increased, confirming the importance of the „strong political commitment‟ idea from 
Hagemann (2010).  
In general, existing independent fiscal institutions have been successful in 
influencing fiscal policy in their countries. In this respect, the EC (2006b, 2010b) 
confirms that many existing independent institutions – FPCs and others – seem to have 
influenced the public debate and are benefiting from large media coverage. The 
forecasts, analyses, recommendations and other policy advice from independent fiscal 
institutions are, indeed, influencing the conduct and developments of fiscal policy and 
thus contributing to fiscal discipline. According to the EC, this is the case at least in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia and Sweden. In these countries, fiscal policy 
councils have earned a good reputation among voters and are highly respected by the 
political establishment. 
This latter example confirms that informal independence, namely a council‟s 
reputation, is vital for making both the public and politicians aware of the councils‟ 
activities [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a)]. Mihályi (2010) argues that, from the 
outset, councils must demonstrate total independence from the government while 
building a highly technical team of experts to gain the necessary credibility from 
political leaders, financial markets, the press and the public at large. However, this 
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process is usually slow, and a large amount of time is needed to build a good reputation. 
Therefore, a wise suggestion would be to delegate the tasks to older, well-reputed 
institutions sufficiently capable to perform them, instead of creating a new council from 
scratch. However, the risk with such a solution would be to have a council designed and 
shaped to fit within an existing institution, along with its traditions and governing 
structures already consolidated, instead of a council specifically designed and shaped to 
respond to the specific domestic fiscal policy problems in an unambiguous manner.    
Rivlin (2010) states that, for young councils, establishing trust is difficult. It may 
be necessary to survive an inter-party change in government for a council to gain the 
trust of the politicians, the media and the general public. Until this happens, the FPC 
risks being seen as the government‟s political opposition rather than an impartial and 
independent body concentrating on fiscal policy only. For instance, the CBO – in which 
Alice Rivlin was the first Director – had to survive that change before being able to 
prove its (now widely recognized) impartiality. An interesting proposal in this respect is 
from Calmfors (2010a), who says that in the short-term, a government can help a new 
FPC get a „flying start‟ by publicly committing to build on its analyses and heed its 
advice. Likewise, the government can include or mention the council‟s 
recommendations or analyses in the budget bill and other policy documents. 
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the government‟s appreciation of the national FPC 
tends to be greater before rather than after its establishment. 
There are some other noteworthy questions that directly influence the 
effectiveness of councils. The first issue is if councils really need an official status. It 
has been argued that academics and individuals from the public are able to play the 
same role as FPCs. This criticism is countered by three main arguments. First, having an 
official status enables more influence over policy; it is a way of getting an edge in 
media attention since there are many „competitors‟. Second, an official council can be 
given an official role in the budget process. However, the third and strongest argument 
is that a council commits independent academics and other economic experts to „a 
sustained and consistent participation in the public discussion about fiscal policy‟ 
[Calmfors (2010a)]. In fact, the reality in most developed countries is that it has become 
very difficult to get academics to actively and regularly participate in the public 
economic policy debate, particularly due to their increasing specialization in specific 
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areas of knowledge. Hence, an FPC can fill this void by re-directing „academic talent in 
the direction of fiscal policy evaluation‟. Moreover, the direct involvement of an FPC in 
the budget process may be a positive factor and may allow it to convey messages in a 
direct and efficient way. This involvement could occur in various degrees. For example, 
the council could attend regular hearings in the parliament during the preparation of the 
budget, or the government could be obliged to justify departures from the council‟s 
recommendations. A bolder arrangement would be to make the use of the council‟s 
forecasts mandatory in the budget process or even to make the council‟s approval of the 
draft budget mandatory [EC (2006b, 2010b)]. 
Another aspect of FPCs worth discussing is their democratic legitimacy. In fact, 
the legitimacy of councils to evaluate elected representatives is sometimes questioned. 
Nevertheless, the reality is that the council‟s job is to further rationalize economic 
constraints and bear closer in mind the preferences of the majority of voters. In addition, 
FPCs might substantially increase the government‟s accountability for its policies. This 
can be achieved by increasing the amount of reliable and impartial information made 
available to the public. On the other hand, when an FPC evaluates policy and makes 
normative recommendations, the risk of misusing its powers and defining its own policy 
agenda becomes, indeed, real. This is why it is highly advisable to have councils not 
setting their own economic-policy objectives but, on the contrary, base their activities 
on objectives previously set within the political system, notably on those inscribed in 
their Statutes. Then, the recommendations and evaluations issued by councils will only 
focus on the possibility of reaching the pre-set political objectives [Calmfors (2010a)]. 
It is crucial to explain how FPCs are going to solve most of the problems exposed 
in Chapter 2, because such an explanation is indeed their rationale. In general, the aim 
of the proposals of specific councils is to tackle one or some of the underlying causes of 
fiscal indiscipline and deficit bias. Hence, such proposals and the extent to which they 
overcome those problems shall be presented here. 
One of the most recommended types of FPCs is the one that assesses the 
budgetary impacts of fiscal measures and provides analytical inputs to the political 
processes, especially high-quality independent macroeconomic forecasts, policy 
evaluations and/or impact assessments. Such agencies may also be mandated to monitor 
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the consistency between ex post government policy and ex ante objectives, which would 
allow it to effectively constrain discretionary fiscal policy-making [Calmfors (2005)]. In 
this respect, the EC (2006a) claims that these analytical fiscal councils would improve 
the effectiveness of national-level rules. In addition, they would address the deficit-
enhancing problem of procyclical biases during upturns.  
The tendency of governments to „inflate the growth forecasts underlying 
budgetary plans‟ may also be reversed by introducing forecasting fiscal councils. There 
are some proposals designed to deliver independent macroeconomic forecasts [e.g., 
Jonung and Larch (2006) and Kirsanova et al. (2007)]. Jonung and Larch (2006) 
diagnose a problem of over-optimism in a number of governments‟ projections of 
macroeconomic variables. The central problem is that the bias affects fiscal 
performance and leads to larger deficits and a faster accumulation of debt, being one of 
the sources of deficit bias. Therefore, if a country‟s budget process is based on biased 
forecasts, a wise way of purging it is to create an authority that depoliticizes the 
production of economic forecasts (of growth rates and other variables) and that takes 
over the task of producing the mandatory forecasts that underpin budgetary plans. In 
order to guarantee independence, this agency would have to be shielded from external 
interference, especially from domestic political pressures, which could be achieved by 
giving it legislative protection. Similarly, Kirsanova et al. (2007) propose the creation of 
a Fiscal Monitoring Commission, funded by the government, which would be charged 
with producing the best available projections for the public sector finances. Hence, if 
projections indicated that there was a significant chance that the public finances were 
not sustainable or that the debt path were sub-optimal, the Commission would publish 
proposals for changes to aggregate spending or taxes. In turn, the government would be 
required to publish a response to these proposals. 
Councils may also have a role to play when it comes to informational deficiencies, 
economic illiteracy of voters, or severe asymmetries of information between the 
government and the public. Voters are often unaware of the true costs of tax cuts and 
spending increases. An FPC can produce and improve the availability of information on 
this matter for the voters and so encourage them to make a more rational and informed 
judgment about the government‟s competence, argues Wren-Lewis (2011). Besides, 
there is evidence – for instance from the Dutch CPB – confirming that information-
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oriented councils effectively discourage both government and opposition parties from 
bribing and/or pandering to the electorate before elections. Rogoff and Bertelsmann 
(2010) adds that, to address the public lack of information and naiveté, FPCs can run 
educational and awareness campaigns, and increase the availability of economic studies 
explaining the costs of indebtedness.  
Impatience is another related cause of indiscipline that councils may help 
counteract. When the electorate is impatient and does not understand the fiscal 
sustainability dynamics – like the need for procyclical policies – a fiscal council can 
play an informative role by raising awareness and consciousness within the public. This 
is a task not so easily played by a government preoccupied with elections. In addition, 
the government can be impatient too and, in this case, a fiscal council can be another 
source of political pressure. These possible tasks are indications of how a fiscal 
watchdog can go a long way in approximating the government‟s preferences with those 
of society [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a) and Wren-Lewis (2011)].  
Calmfors (2010a) also refers to some possible tasks that a transparency-oriented 
council could perform. It could make analyses known to increase awareness of the 
future costs of current deficits as well as of the risks associated with hidden debts and 
liabilities
7
. In addition, it could maintain a vigilant monitoring of all off-budget items 
and attempts of creative accounting. In turn, Annett et al. (2005) see FPCs as part of the 
strategy to strengthen the SGP. These bodies could play a relevant role in the attainment 
of the EU fiscal framework‟s objectives. They could review the national Stability 
Programs and help address problems such as the reliance on one-off measures and 
misreporting problems. In effect, this kind of activity would be of help in implementing 
and enforcing the SGP as well as in fostering national ownership of fiscal rules. 
Also important is the possibility of assessing the feasibility and the impacts of 
some governmental projects from a fiscal sustainability standpoint. Calmfors et al. 
(2010) argue that fiscal councils can be useful in predicting the need of structural 
reforms by alerting the government and the public to future fiscal risks and stress. 
Furthermore, councils can also help inform voters of what policies are and are not in 
their interest from an economic angle and remind the public of the government‟s 
                                                          
7
 See also Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010). 
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intertemporal budget constraint, particularly by highlighting the possible consequences 
of non-compliance with the constraint. In addition, FPCs can also bring some issues – 
like the long-run effects of fiscal policy and debt sustainability – to the political agenda, 
thus promoting its debate and bestowing them with the importance they deserve. 
Besides that, they can improve the quality of the economic policy debate in parliament 
by providing impartial and objective macro-fiscal analyses. 
Fiscal councils can also alleviate common-pool problems. FPCs may issue 
recommendations to strengthen the authority of the finance minister when he is 
negotiating the budget with spending ministers and other agents. It would promote the 
necessary adjustments between the benefits added and the costs inflicted by (greedy) 
agents. In addition: “(...) in more fragmented political systems, the recommendations of 
a fiscal council could form the basis of contracts between political actors that in effect 
internalized fiscal discipline” [in Wren-Lewis (2011), p.18]. Moreover, von Hagen 
(2010) and von Hagen and Harden (1994) also propose the creation of a body that 
would be able to counteract common pool problems. This agency would serve as a 
coordinating device for the budget by imposing an annual ceiling for the budget deficit. 
In order to implement the deficit ceilings, the agency would require delegation of 
enforcement powers and, so, it would be difficult for it to obtain the necessary political 
support. However, a fiscal watchdog would also be able to play such a coordination 
role, notably by encouraging spending ministers to respect the pre-set fiscal objectives 
[Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a)]. 
Von Hagen (2010) also considers that a fiscal council can be more effective at 
addressing problems of fiscal opacity, informational problems or issues related to the 
common-pool of resources rather than the time inconsistency of preferences in fiscal 
policy. The reasoning behind is that resolving time inconsistency implies delegating 
policy in an undemocratic fashion to an independent council, since the council‟s 
decisions would have distributive consequences. However, Calmfors and Wren-Lewis 
(2011a) counter-argue that an FPC that guards fiscal rules and advises the government 
may indeed reduce time inconsistency of preferences and inflation bias. As fiscal rules 
deal with deficit bias arising from this type of time inconsistency, a fiscal council can 
thus safeguard such rules in case policy-makers have incentives to depart from them.  
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FPCs may also guard fiscal policy from being used for political reasons. Councils 
can reduce the strategic use of debt for electoral competition as well as restrain the 
presence of political budget cycles. If the parties in the parliament agree to implement a 
fiscal rule to counter deficit bias arising from electoral competition, then an FPC can act 
as guardian of the rule and raise the cost for politicians trying to breach it [Calmfors and 
Wren-Lewis (2011a)]. In addition, fiscal councils‟ macro-fiscal analyses help deter 
incumbent governments from signalling their competence to the electorate through 
deficit-increasing policies. Hence, as the electorate begins to be informed about these 
economic-related subjects, it would be harder for politicians to pursue their electoral 
interests by means of mesmerizing voters with deficit-consuming policies before 
elections [Calmfors (2010a)]. 
The proposals of fiscal councils do not solely address domestic institutions but 
also transnational institutions. For instance, some authors refer to the need of further 
discussing the possibility of establishing a council that cuts across the European EMU.  
The Council of the European Union (2010) advocates for a stronger economic 
governance that may be attained by means of encouraging interdependence between the 
economies of the Union, particularly within the euro area. It is within the context of 
reinforced governance that it makes sense to talk about an FPC at the EMU‟s level.  
One may ask why the EC, for example, cannot play the role of a European FPC. 
Kirsanova et al. (2007) argue that, even by regularly monitoring budget developments 
and issuing public recommendations, the EC falls short of what a council may be 
required to do. The reason is that EC activity is too tied up by requirements from the 
SGP. Nevertheless, even if it was not, monitoring by the EC would always interfere 
with the strategic position of other Member States, argue Kirsanova et al. (2007). To 
prove this, Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2007) build a model testing if a European 
watchdog could act as a signaller of Member States governments‟ indiscipline. The 
authors assume that as the EDP depends on peer pressure to be implemented, the more 
undisciplined Member States are as a whole, the less that pressure is and the lower the 
probability of sanctions. They find that, given the peer pressure procedures of the SGP, 
the scenarios in which a European watchdog would have incentives to signal 
indiscipline are scarce. Therefore, it could be counterproductive for a watchdog to 
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signal the Member State‟s indiscipline because it could encourage other peer States to 
raise their deficits as well. 
Apart the aforementioned proposal of delegating evaluation and ratings of 
national FPCs to an independent international entity, there are other proposals worth 
noting. Calmfors (2010a) suggests that a European council could, based on 
macroeconomic risk considerations, decide in advance on appropriate haircuts in the 
event of future sovereign debt restructuring. Another consideration is from Lane (2010) 
arguing for the importance of some sort of international cooperation network between 
national FPCs to change impressions and develop best-practice analytical frameworks.  
Even earlier, Fatás et al. (2003) had also proposed the creation of a sustainability 
council for the Eurozone. Its mandate would be to assess Member States‟ national fiscal 
sustainability, to publicly detail their analyses and recommendations, and to advise the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) to initiate the EDP. Another 
proposal for an independent committee of European fiscal experts is from Burda and 
Gerlach (2010). Their „fiscal stability board‟ would monitor fiscal developments in the 
Eurozone, vet governments‟ justifications of fiscal deficits, and assess – as well as 
publicly comment on – proposed consolidations. This board would be small and 
manageable, composed of legal scholars, former senior central bankers, members of 
academia from across the Eurozone (especially economists), and also some former 
finance ministers, so that it would be taken seriously in the political sphere.  
Similarly, the ECB (2010) endorses the idea of a fiscal agency tasked to „monitor 
and assess national budgetary developments and advise the Eurogroup and the Council‟. 
This proposal would aim at strengthening European governance, notably through 
enhancing fiscal surveillance, increasing the enforcement of fiscal discipline and 
providing the right incentives for Member States to comply with EU fiscal rules. Also 
important are the arguments from Calmfors (2010a) who believes that an independent 
fiscal council at the European level could assure that national fiscal frameworks would 
meet certain minimum standards or, alternatively, could deliver macroeconomic 
surveillance of Member States within a more judgmental role. Its main justification is 
that it would be best to have an independent European body carrying out surveillance 
given the extraordinary exposure to political interference this task encompasses. 
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5. Experiences with FPCs 
  
Having understood the underpinnings of FPCs, the natural next step is to scan 
existing councils, getting to know about their experiences. These may teach important 
lessons in order to start drafting good practices. For instance, analyzing the existing 
councils‟ experiences may be helpful to picture the likely challenges of integrating 
domestic fiscal frameworks and to learn how to actually influence fiscal policy 
outcomes. Therefore, this chapter offers a non-exhaustive overview of national fiscal 
councils, with a major focus on the European countries, gathering some considerations 
about their impacts on policy and other experiences.  
After the establishment of some early FPCs in the third quarter of the twentieth 
century, such as the German Council of Economic Experts in 1963 or the CBO in 1974, 
other countries followed suit and created their own national FPCs. However, it was only 
recently – from the late 1990s to the present date – that the idea of FPCs has gained 
special momentum again. Accordingly, several countries have recently established 
councils while others reorganized existing fiscal institutions, widening their mandate in 
order to accommodate some of the functions and tasks that are commonly assigned to 
FPCs. All in all, for many modern economies, the establishment of FPCs became a 
viable solution, especially since many of them started to face unaffordable public 
indebtedness.  
Before discussing the impacts and experiences of fiscal councils, it may be useful 
to have a clearer picture of the presence of Fiscal Councils within Europe, especially in 
the euro area. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the existing fiscal councils in euro area 
countries and in the UK, Sweden, Canada and the USA. This table only includes the 
fiscal institutions that are generally and explicitly identified as fiscal councils. However, 
one should be mindful of the existence of other fiscal institutions, more or less 
independent from governments, which may play important roles within national fiscal 
frameworks. Table 5.1 includes information about the date of establishment, the 
composition and the functions each national council has to fulfil. 
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Table 5.1 – National fiscal councils in the euro area (and four other examples), 2012 
Sources: European Commission, Fiscal councils‟ websites and Kopits (2011) [see EC (2012) and EC fiscal institutions database in 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/independent_institutions/index_en.htm].  
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From Table 5.1, one may notice that 7 out of the 17 Euro area countries have 
established fiscal councils. The eighth country in the list is likely to be Slovakia, since it 
intends to establish such an agency in the near future. Cyprus, Finland and Italy, do not 
have anything resembling fiscal councils, whereas fiscal governance in the remaining 
countries comprises of some independent fiscal institutions that, despite not being fiscal 
councils, are bodies that perform some of the tasks that could be mandated to fiscal 
councils. For instance, Estonia has a National Audit Office that was formed in 1990 
(and reorganized in 2005) and is mandated to audit public accounts and to produce 
advice to government on a number of fiscal issues. It has a staff of approximately 90 
people. Further, Malta has a Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) 
that works with and advises the Maltese government on relevant socioeconomic issues. 
Luxembourg, France and Spain all have Courts of Auditors. Besides, France also has 
the Commission Economique de la Nation and Spain has the National Committee of 
Local Administrations (CNAL). Greece constitutes a different case, as it has the KEPE, 
the Greek Centre of Planning and Economic Research, but no longer has any active 
FPC. The fiscal council GPK – the Greek abbreviation for the State Budget Execution 
Monitoring Office – that was formed in 2011 became inactive in the same year. After 
publishing a report highlighting the fact that the Greek sovereign debt was 'out of 
control' and that the government‟s budgetary targets for 2011 would not be met, the new 
council had to deal with an immediate and fierce reaction from the Greek government 
discrediting the council's and the council members‟ work. This episode took place in 
August 2011 and led the head of the agency, Stella Savva-Balfousia, to resign, leaving 
this agency of independent analysts on hold. 
Slovenia instituted its fiscal council in 2009. With only seven members (backed 
by government staff), and limited financial and technical resources, the council has not 
yet managed to establish a strong reputation. Nonetheless, its wide remit allows its 
members to address the Slovenian major fiscal policy problems. So far, the council has 
delivered its annual reports, although these have not been able to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the country‟s public finances.  
In contrast, the German CEE has a narrower remit than the Slovenian FC but, 
since its establishment in 1963, has had the time and spirit to provide politicians, 
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institutions and the electorate with impartial, independent and valuable analysis, 
allowing it to build a strong reputation. It is composed of academics and is intended to 
advise German policy-makers on economic policy and to assess the macroeconomic 
developments in Germany. It also aims at helping both the public and other relevant 
institutions to formulate informed judgments regarding fiscal issues. The council‟s 
perceived professionalism has granted its reports and assessments an important role in 
German economic policy-making, notably influencing several political decisions.  
In Canada, the Parliamentary Budget Officer was established in 2006 and is 
mandated to provide the Parliament with assessments of the nation‟s finances, to 
evaluate the government‟s estimates and to comment on the trends in the economy. It 
also performs cost analyses – i.e., it estimates the financial cost of proposals – upon 
request from parliamentarians or official committees. The PBO is a parliamentarian 
agency created in order to bridge the access-to-information gap between the Canadian 
government and parliament. The appointed Officer together with a staff of 13 form a 
genuine fiscal council. The remaining councils listed in Table 5.1 are presented below. 
However, before further reviewing the individual experiences of councils throughout 
Europe (and the US), it may be useful to look at these experiences in aggregate in order 
to figure out if these institutions are de facto influencing policy and fostering discipline.  
When considering the impacts that fiscal institutions have on policy outcomes, 
some factors should be taken into account. In spite of the complexity associated with 
quantitative analyses of fiscal agencies, Debrun and Kumar (2008) conducted an 
econometric study to assess these factors. They use a broad definition of fiscal 
institutions, including councils, courts of auditors, wisepersons committees and other. 
Therefore, its conclusions apply to councils only to a limited extent
1
. Yet, it is important 
to note the study‟s key findings. First, well-designed institutions increase the costs faced 
by policy-makers in case of departures from sound policies. One can deduce then that 
institutions can indeed help counteract fiscal profligacy. Also, a positive relationship 
between the stringency of rules and the role of independent institutions is noticed. Such 
a correlation validates the complementarity hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3. Also, 
                                                          
1
 For instance, as noted by Kopits (2011), although the study of Debrun and Kumar (2008) is 
methodologically rigorous, its conclusions are highly questionable since they are drawn from a 
comparison of very different entities from different countries, which, thus, are not comparable. 
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Debrun and Kumar (2008) find a strong correlation between budgetary institutions and 
fiscal performance. However, although the direction of causality one wants to look for 
is from institutions to fiscal outcomes, there is some evidence of a reverse causality. 
This may mean that well-behaved governments adopt strict rules and institutions to 
reveal the true nature of their preferences, rather than that undisciplined governments 
adopt institutions that self-impose some necessary fiscal constraints. The authors called 
it the signalling hypothesis. In this regard, von Hagen (2010) underlines the difficulty of 
judging the councils‟ effectiveness except over long time horizons. Only time will allow 
the discrediting, or not, of the signalling hypothesis. Still, doubting a council‟s success 
if it faces an uncooperative government, von Hagen (2010) corroborates the view that a 
reverse causality can apply between fiscal institutions and outcomes. At any rate, one 
conclusion seems to be consensual, a fiscal council can indeed be effective at 
contributing to the soundness of fiscal outcomes when governments are minimally 
committed to fiscal discipline: “(…) if a certain degree of commitment exists, it can be 
bolstered by an FC” [in Debrun et al. (2009), p.66]. 
Another attempt at measuring the extent to which the existence of independent 
fiscal agencies can be linked to budgetary outcomes is from the EC (2006b). Its analysis 
is based on the answers to a questionnaire sent to all independent fiscal institutions 
established within the EU, and on other internal analyses. One of the findings is that 
whenever forecasting was delegated to an independent body, a real correction of the 
bias towards over-optimism was observed
2
. Moreover, even though appearing only to 
capture, on average, moderate media attention, fiscal institutions were perceived to be 
credible and to create a „positive and significant‟ impact on the public debate. Another 
insight is that governments seem to follow recommendations issued by these institutions 
in more than half the cases. However, this tends to be highly linked to the credibility 
and recognized quality of the institutions. Ultimately, the main message from the study 
is that independent institutions indeed contribute to more fiscal discipline. 
In spite of the difficulty of running regressions and conducting econometric 
analyses to assess the effectiveness of FPCs, one can still learn from the experiences 
and testimonies of existing councils. Some considerations are pertinent.  
                                                          
2
 Those results are consistent with Jonung and Larch (2004) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). 
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A first important insight is from Kopits (2011) who argues that FPCs must be 
completely home-grown and home-owned. They must address local needs and smoothly 
integrate local cultures and traditions. There is no recipe one can import from abroad 
given that credibility is not transferable. In addition, councils must be independent, non-
partisan, technically competent and accountable to the legislature. Their governing body 
must be appropriately remunerated and free from conflict of interest. Lastly, the speed 
in implementation of a council is crucial because its non-partisanship has to be quickly 
proven and its role has to be understood by the public and by politicians; its benefits 
have to be revealed promptly. Thus, it is important for the council to create an identity 
for itself and start operating according to its terms of reference right away.  
Also, some important reflections about the mandates and tasks of FPCs are 
necessary. The first refers to the complementarity between councils and rules. There are 
some cases, such as the one of the USA, where rules and councils do not coexist and/or 
work in parallel. Nevertheless, the vast majority of countries that have already 
established FPCs have fiscal rules. Thus, it should be natural to mandate national 
councils to monitor their government‟s compliance with fiscal rules. In fact, this is the 
reality of a considerable number of councils. Secondly, it is worth noting that very few 
fiscal councils, apart from the Slovenian and the Swedish ones, are mandated to analyse 
how the medium-term fiscal objectives conform to higher-level, more fundamental 
objectives. The absence of this task from other councils‟ remit can indicate that „most 
governments shy away from potential criticism of their chosen targets‟, observe 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a). A last reflection relates to the inclusion of the 
production of analyses upon request in a council‟s mandate. Some argue that this could 
remedy the commonly perceived idea that councils politically „favour‟ the opposition 
parties (especially before elections when parties are trying to win votes), as they 
typically point out the flaws of governments and not of the opposition. One idea, 
practiced by the CPB in the Netherlands, is to let the FPC review the electoral programs 
of political parties before elections. This analysis enhances the comparability between 
the parties‟ electoral platforms, as well as broadens the public‟s understanding and 
explains the economic and financial implications of the parties‟ proposals. 
Alternatively, the council could be mandated to produce the costing of initiatives upon 
request – from the parliament or other official bodies, for example – as is done in the 
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CBO and in the Canadian PBO. For instance, the CBO produces cost estimates that 
show how specific bills would affect spending and/or revenues in the federal budget
3
. 
Hence, analyses upon request also help to increase awareness, among both politicians 
and voters, of the implications of policy-making. 
In addition to the considerations above, it may be beneficial now to collect a 
handful of important lessons from the experiences of already established councils. The 
first lesson concerns the crucial importance of assuring total independence to councils 
prior to their establishment. Sufficient resources and budget have to be guaranteed in 
order to deliver effective, high-quality analysis. Independence is jeopardized if, instead 
of being appropriately provisioned with resources, the council has to „draw on the 
resources of the ministry of finance‟ [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a)]. The incident 
between the Hungarian government and its national fiscal council illustrates this risk. 
As noted by Kopits (2011)
4
, after the council published some critical views about the 
budget bill, the – then recently-elected – Hungarian government was able to restructure 
the national fiscal council, by substantially reducing its funding, narrowing its remit, 
limiting its access to information and altering its composition. These actions were 
widely condemned on multiple occasions. The chairman of the council eventually 
resigned, some of its international peers publicly expressed their opposition – e.g., the 
chairman of the Swedish FPC, of the Dutch CPB and of the English OBR
5
 – and, across 
the world, several members of academia expressed their disagreement with those 
actions. One of the lessons to learn from this case relates to the stipulation of resources 
the council needs for its activity. The availability of resources, as well as the access to 
information, has to be sufficiently armoured from the very start of the council. In this 
respect, the EC (2006b, 2010b) recommends stipulating the financing of the FPC in a 
formal and sound legal text. Additionally, designing a long-term budget may also help 
to remove any temptations from the government of monopolizing the council through 
the size of its budget [Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011a)]. Another possibility is to 
delegate the funding of FPCs to another independent entity such as the ICB. In Austria, 
for example, it is the national central bank that bears the costs of the Austrian 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.cbo.gov/cost-estimates/. 
4
 George Kopits was the chairman of the Hungarian Fiscal Council between 2009 and 2011. 
5
 Lars Calmfors (SFPC), Coen Teulings (CPB) and Robert Chote (OBR) wrote a letter to the Financial 
Times on the 6
th
 of December, 2010, condemning the “liquidation” of the Hungarian Council by the 
Hungarian Government. 
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Government Debt Committee, as well as provides for the necessary personnel and 
material expenses. Another example is the Portuguese council whose budget has to be 
appraised by the national Court of Auditors. In short, better mechanisms to eliminate the 
high vulnerability of FPCs to political interference have to be discovered, particularly in 
order to protect recently established councils. Again, central banks may provide useful 
insights about formal provisions for independence. The amelioration of these provisions 
would result in a higher council survival rate.  
The inclusion of forecasting in an FPCs‟ mandate also deserves some reflection. 
Producing forecasts critically depends on three conditions: on a timely and complete 
supply of quality data, on the labour force, notably on hiring highly-skilled technicians, 
and on the availability of complex and costly working tools (e.g. software). When 
forecasting is included in a council‟s mandate, the amount of operational resources 
needed increases considerably. Therefore, forecasting may crowd out other possible 
tasks the council could perform. Besides, as the government usually provides the data 
inputs needed, the delegation of forecasting may precipitate breaches of independence 
and attempts of political manipulation. Accordingly, Bos and Teulings (2010) highlight 
the exposure to the government that forecasting brings to a council. For instance, not 
infrequently has the Dutch CPB been pressured from cabinet ministers to adjust its 
forecasts. In addition, even if made with credible data, forecasts do not usually manage 
to mirror the future with precision, turning out to be wrong ex post. Therefore, a real 
risk of including this task in the councils‟ mandate is that forecasting errors may 
weaken the councils‟ credibility in the public eye and within the capital markets and/or 
international bodies [Calmfors (2010a)]. Besides, governments may also use these 
errors and downturns in credibility as weapons to weaken the FPC. One possible way of 
circumventing this is to only mandate councils with the task of commenting on 
governments‟ forecasts, particularly by evaluating the macroeconomic overviews 
adopted by governments and their consistency with the budget projections. This task 
was mandated to the recently established Portuguese FPC
6
. 
Existing councils are divided about forecasting. Around half produce their own 
forecasts, while the remaining half does not. The English OBR provides a recent 
                                                          
6
 See Barbosa et al. (2011). 
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illustration of the difficulties related to forecasting. It was set up in May 2010 with a 
mandate to provide the official forecasts to the British government. Nevertheless, to 
produce fiscal forecasts a council must have detailed knowledge of government 
spending plans and tax receipts. The council either chooses to do it alone and expends a 
huge amount of resources, or it requests the government‟s assistance and expertise. The 
OBR chose the latter
7
. The council assumed the risk of having the government‟s 
officials try to strategically influence its activities, thus endangering its independence. 
Besides, as the budget is usually prepared in secrecy, and as forecasts are produced 
while policy decisions are being made, it is unavoidable that the public believes that 
non-transparent negotiations about numbers between the OBR and the government take 
place. Thus, it has also been unavoidable having the public (and the government‟s 
opposition) questioning the independence and credibility of the OBR from the very start 
of its activity. Hence, the council has been repeatedly criticized and publicly attacked 
within politics, in the media and by academics. The lesson in this case is more like an 
unanswered question: it is not clear if it is wise to delegate forecasting in a situation 
where governments control fiscal instruments, because the independence of the council 
may be severely compromised [Wren-Lewis (2011)]. Nevertheless, the OBR has made 
serious efforts to demonstrate its independence, especially when working with the 
government. Prominently places on its website are devoted to explain all of its 
interactions with the government as well as the measures undertaken in order to ensure 
transparency at all times in the council‟s activities. 
The Dutch CPB started operations in 1945 and was formally instituted in 1947. 
Not without some difficulties, the CPB built its reputation over the years and presents 
itself within the country as a very well-reputed technical body providing objective and 
sound economic policy analyses, forecasts and models. Bos and Teulings (2010) draw 
on the CPB‟s experience and provide some lessons about the relationship between FPCs 
and politics. They believe councils must present the economic consequences of the 
governments‟ policies as well as their alternatives – and consequent trade-offs – but still 
„refrain from becoming an active player in the political arena‟. All relevant topics 
deserve to be targeted by the independent experts‟ impartial opinions, even the more 
                                                          
7
 Notwithstanding, the CBO, for example, produces fiscal forecasts itself. The difference is that the CBO 
needs to assess spending plans and tax receipts for other purposes (mainly for costing of policy 
initiatives) and so the resources would be spent anyway. 
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politically sensitive ones. Nevertheless, it is advisable to adopt a technocratic and 
objective attitude, language and presence, especially in media appearances. Moreover, 
fiscal councils should refrain from interfering in the political debate, especially during 
periods of electoral competition. The authors‟ argument is: “This rule of conduct implies 
that CPB has a greater freedom in putting forward arguments in the initial stage of the 
debate on a certain topic, when political parties have not yet taken a strong stance on 
the topic” [in Bos and Teulings (2010), p.22]. 
The experience with the CPB is a solid example that newly-formed councils must 
consider. In the Netherlands, it plays a unique role in fiscal policy-making by providing 
GDP growth projections, sustainability analyses and other macroeconomic forecasts. 
Moreover, the EC (2012) states that it has a central role in correcting and giving 
credibility to the implementation of the Dutch Medium Term Budgetary framework.  
Another case that deserves to be cited is the one of the Austrian Government Debt 
Committee. Founded in 1970, it had its mandate extended in 2002 to include a number 
of budget advisory tasks. Its mission is to independently monitor and evaluate the 
financial situation in Austria. Since the mandate extension, the Committee‟s activities 
encompass the analysis and measurement of the impacts of fiscal policy on the economy 
according to sustainability criteria. It also monitors compliance with fiscal rules, notably 
with the SGP, assesses the debt dynamics, and issues normative analyses and 
recommendations. This committee is composed of a number of experts in 
financial/budget issues who are appointed by the federal government as well as by the 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and the Chamber of Labour.  
The fields of action of the Austrian Debt Committee may be a good target for 
other FPCs to consider. One of those fields refers to structural developments in all 
levels of government. For instance, it closely follows the dynamics of both revenues and 
expenditure of not only central government but also of provinces and municipalities. In 
addition, its analyses also include a vast number of budget items such as pension 
systems, public health services and education. This transversal analysis of the public 
sector gives a clearer overview of the country‟s public finances situation than otherwise. 
It allows the council to produce advice, not on concrete measures, but on the structural 
reforms the country may need to undertake, especially regarding expenditures with 
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investment character. It is worth noting that, since 2002, almost all of the Committee‟s 
recommendations have received unanimous approval by Austrian governments. At the 
same time, the attention of Austrian decision-makers, media and citizens towards these 
recommendations have grown considerably since 2002 [Chaloupek (2011)]. 
Also interesting is the recent Swedish experience with its FPC. Following the 
consolidation program Sweden made in the 1990s, notably after the introduction of the 
two budgetary rules of 2007 mentioned in Chapter 3, the Swedish FPC was established 
as a complement to this effort. It was mandated to assess the consistency of 
government‟s policies with fiscal policy targets, as well as to monitor compliance with 
the cyclical 1% budgetary surplus requirement and the annual spending caps. 
Accordingly, the chief objective of the council is to ensure that, during recessions, there 
is sufficient room of manoeuvre within fiscal policy to help as a stabilization tool. 
Notably, the SFPC is required to promote countercyclicality in fiscal policy. Therefore, 
it has some freedom to emphasize the subjects it thinks are appropriate and to present its 
analyses ex ante or ex post relative to policy actions by the government. One of the 
lessons this council can offer is that councils‟ analyses cannot afford to be perceived as 
mechanically recommending the government with more fiscal discipline and restraint; 
rather, they should be genuinely open-minded and considering the peculiarities of each 
situation [Calmfors (2010c)]. For instance, the council must evaluate whether discretion 
is needed for stabilization purposes or not, i.e., the council has to manage the trade-off 
between restraint and flexibility of fiscal policy. Along this line of thought, in 2008 the 
SFPC recommended to the government that it would be best to increase fiscal stimulus 
to counteract the recessive effects that came with the world crisis
8
. 
Another case worthy of note is Belgium with its two active FPCs. Both Hagemann 
(2010) and Coene (2010) refer to the Belgium FPCs (the forecaster – Federal Planning 
Bureau, and the normative analysis provider – High Council of Finance) as being fairly 
effective in their missions and in achieving reasonable impacts on policy-making. The 
fact that there are two and not only one council working on both missions – forecasting 
and issuing normative recommendations – is indeed the basis of one of the lessons 
Belgium has to teach. As Bogaert et al. (2006) suggest, institutions providing positive 
                                                          
8
 See Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009) and Calmfors (2010b). 
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and normative analysis should be completely separated from each other, and 
responsibility should be shared between „several strong independent institutions so as to 
minimize political pressure‟. 
Both Belgian councils are institutions with good reputation among policy-makers 
and the public. The HCF is divided in two sections, one that assesses the public sector 
borrowing requirements (including local governments) and another that focuses on 
taxation and social security contributions. In addition, since 2001, the council also 
includes a study group in partnership with the FPB, which annually analyses the 
budgetary and social consequences of ageing. In general, the HCF activities consist of 
publishing reports (mainly on an annual basis), assessments and opinions on these fiscal 
issues. The EC (2012), in a commentary on the functioning of the HCF, stated that, to 
date, the council‟s budgetary recommendations and its role on fiscal policy coordination 
have „worked broadly satisfactorily‟. Moreover, the FPB, having a wide remit including 
economic, social and environmental policy issues, contributes to the democratic debate 
by extensively propagating its activities. Besides collecting and analysing data, this 
council also „explores plausible evolutions, identifies alternatives, evaluates the impact 
of policy measures and formulates proposals‟9. In addition, its mandate allows it to be 
requested by the government, the parliament, social partners and by national and 
international institutions to produce specific analyses.  
The last focus will be on the countries which recently asked the international 
community for financial bailout: Greece, Ireland and Portugal. As put forth by von 
Hagen (2010), Greece would greatly benefit from establishing an FPC focused on 
improving transparency and predictability. The serious transparency and accountability 
problems within the country came to light after the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, 
among other tasks, a fiscal council in Greece would have to somehow guarantee the 
reliability of the information about the Greek government finances to the public, the 
markets and other stakeholders. Accordingly, the memorandum of understanding 
between Greece and the EU/IMF has required the creation of a non-partisan fiscal 
agency to provide independent and expert scrutiny of government finances, and so in 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.plan.be. 
86 
 
early 2011, the Greek State Budget Execution Monitoring Office was formed. 
Unfortunately, its activities have stagnated since the incidents in August 2011. 
Ireland and Portugal were also compelled to establish their own national FPCs
10
. 
Consequently, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council was established in June 2011 with the 
tasks of independently assessing government compliance with fiscal policy targets/rules 
and of evaluating the soundness of the government‟s macroeconomic and budgetary 
projections
11
. It formally reports at least 3 times per year. Its second fiscal assessment 
report was made public on the 3
rd
 of April, 2012, and addresses the Irish government‟s 
macroeconomic and budgetary projections as well as the government‟s estimated 
overall fiscal stance until 2015. 
In Portugal too, the national FPC – Conselho de Finanças Públicas – has been 
established, having its Statutes approved by the Parliament on October, 2011, and its 
board appointed on January, 2012. In Portugal, several years of fiscal indiscipline has 
led public finances to a breaking point. A mix of persistent deficits, procyclicality and 
procrastination in introducing some necessary structural reforms were the basis of a 
sovereign debt escalation that culminated in a request for an international bailout in 
April 2011. For these reasons, the recently established Portuguese FPC was mandated to 
monitor compliance with fiscal rules, as well as to assess the debt dynamics and 
sustainability, the fiscal sustainability of the various levels of the public sector and the 
impact of their financial situation on public finances. The Portuguese council will also 
comment on the government‟s forecasts and a number of other relevant fiscal issues12. 
In the end, having discussed some examples of national FPCs across Europe and 
America, a fair inference is that councils have and are contributing to the overturn of 
domestic fiscal profligacy and indiscipline. Several international organizations, such as 
the IMF, the EC, the ECB or the OECD, consistently recommend the establishment of 
fiscal councils, taking them as must-have solutions within the national fiscal framework 
of numerous countries. Therefore, the role of FPCs in national institutional fiscal 
frameworks will be increasingly straightforward from here on.  
                                                          
10
 See EU/IMF (2010, 2011) 
11
 See http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/. 
12
 See Diário da República (2011). 
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6. Final Remarks 
 
The outstandingly high sovereign debts in a great number of the richest economies 
in the world must be a concern not only to policy-makers, but also to society in general. 
Instability in the capital markets lead to the anticipation that sovereign defaults may not 
be far off, and thus debt problems have to be quickly addressed. Besides, the stakes are 
high because globalization has brought great economical interconnectivity. Hence, 
procrastination in introducing mechanisms to effectively address the troubles of 
domestic fiscal policies will eventually negatively affect not only individual countries, 
but also many neighbouring countries. This is especially valid in euro area countries 
which, given their level of economic integration, face a wider economic systemic risk.  
Hence, cultures of fiscal indiscipline within countries have to be subverted and 
substituted with one of discipline. Fiscal discipline, which helps to promote a growth-
enhancing, macroeconomically stable environment, will allow policy-makers to honour 
the real preferences of the society as a whole. In addition, principles such as prudence, 
responsibility and transparency have to be comprehensively reinforced in fiscal policy-
making. Economic governance, both at national and EU levels, has to be redesigned to 
remove, or at least minimize, the political failures underlying protracted deficits. 
Therefore, in the short-term, a reform of fiscal frameworks appears as the best path to 
take. A rules-based framework complemented by an independent fiscal policy council is 
a plausible option.  
In this sense, the current sovereign crises, besides difficult times, are also crucial 
opportunities to introduce structural changes. For instance, the sovereign debt crises in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal are being used to reshape their fiscal frameworks, in 
accordance with the recommendations of the IMF, the EC and the ECB. Notably, all the 
memorandums of understanding signed between these three countries and their financial 
rescuers required the establishment of fiscal policy councils.  
This is only one example of the support international institutions grant to the idea 
of fiscal councils. The expectations surrounding FPCs are affirmed by the success of 
existing councils around the world, including those in Europe. 
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